Oregon OSHA found “alleged violations” and levied $11,500 in fines in the Aug. 1, 2003, cannon accident that caused the death of a Boy Scout (Fall 2003, Vol. 24, No. 4).
Christopher Kroker sustained head injuries when a cannon he and an assistant were trying to fire blew apart on their third attempt. The 16-year-old was on the summer staff at the Cascade Pacific Boy Scout Council’s Camp Meriwether near Tillamook.
The 3-foot cast iron cannon was believed to be from England.
Oregon’s Department of Consumer and Business Services Occupational Safety and Health Division (Oregon OSHA) did not identify a direct cause of death.
The investigation found that workers were not properly instructed and supervised and that the cannon was overloaded with black powder and projectiles.
It was noted that the employer did not address basic national artillery safety procedures for use of a rammer, quality of powder charges, necessary protective equipment and safe positions during loading and firing.
OSHA classified three of the violations as “serious” and two as “other-than-serious.” A press release explained that the civil penalty for violations is “based on the likelihood and severity of potential injuries” resulting from violations.
The most serious violation was that “supervisors supplied an inappropriate grade, and amount, of gun powder for use in the cannon.” Seven thousand dollars of the fine was for this violation.
The camp was fined another $2,500 for the hazardous manner in which the explosive was stored, handled or transported. In addition, the grade of powder was “outside of national artillery safety standards for cannon” and the quantity exceeded safety standards.
A third violation was the camp’s failure to keep open flames at least 100 feet from where explosives were used. OSHA found that the powder was stored within 100 feet of a forging operation and a campfire. The fine was $1,500.
The camp was also fined $500 for having 11 or more employees and no required safety committee. There was no fine for not having records of assessing the workplace to determine if hazards existed.
Patrick O’Neill of the Portland Oregonian reported more details given by safety division administrator Peter DeLuca during the press conference at which findings were announced.
According to O’Neill, “A key element in the explosion was the use of fine-grained, fast-burning powder that is normally used in muzzle-loaded pistols.” Also, “Adding to the stress on the cannon’s barrel was a 35mm film canister half-filled with sand, which was being used as a projectile.”
OSHA compared the camp’s artillery procedures with those of the American Artillery Association. DeLuca said they found Scout leaders had no formal training and used “guesswork.” The camp’s training video, which showed someone standing in front of the barrel to load, and no use of hearing protection, didn’t cover the amount of propellant or use of a rammer.
DeLuca told the press conference that the cannon was intended to be fired with a fuse, but since the firing had to happen at a specific time during the evening flag-lowering ceremony, the Scouts were lighting priming powder in the vent.
Artilleryman editor C. Peter Jorgensen told the newspaper that cast iron cannon are generally considered ornamental and are not meant to be fired unless the barrels are lined with seamless high-strength steel tubing. He added that fast-burning pistol powder and the film canister could easily have brought pressure in the barrel to the bursting point.