"Battle Study: A Guide through the History of Field Artillery" was originally published in the October 1989 issue of Field Artillery, A Professional Bulletin for Redlegs.
Our objective is to create a historical framework for analyzing the performance of artillery in battle. This approach makes the deliberate study of how others reacted to battle — in effect, a simulation — an exercise in how to deal with the unknown.
The topics guide you in the analysis of our recommended reading list. ... As a companion book for the readings, we suggest R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy's, The Encyclopedia of Military History (New York: Harper & Row, 1970). This single volume contains a concise summary of all the battles and campaigns discussed. ...
Studying Battle
In most human endeavors, it appears that performance improves with practice. It seems likely that this pattern would hold true in the mental preparation for war. As a result, the soldier who more deeply considers the dynamics of war through history should be more capable of dealing with them when faced with the problem of putting training into practice on some future battlefield.
The question of how to study battle really begs the more fundamental question of how to study history. The key to the answer is the critical use of sources. History needs to be read as a detective story rather than a novel. Its purpose is to provide information for analysis, not entertain.
As you study each topic, try to strip away the romantic and self-serving to identify controversial issues for debate and evaluate the adequacy and character of evidence provided. In other words, become a critical thinker.
The focus of this guide is on artillery at the tactical level of war, the level at which company-grade soldiers operate. Analyzing the tactical history of fire support is a complex task. The organization and employment of artillery has always been governed by a number of factors.
To illustrate this, we constructed a battle study model. This model portrays the relationship of the elements of the artillery system. The objective of the course of study is to evaluate their effects on the system over time and discover how soldiers and leaders responded to the dynamics of change.
In short, you look at how various model "inputs" change [resources: technology, human factors, structure, logistics, tactics]. Then look at how these factors affect the performance of the artillery system — "outputs" (e.g., performance in battle or changes in other aspects of the system). ...
17th Century Artillery
The 17th century witnessed the rise of the state of Europe. Commensurate with the increase of the political and economic power of the states' central governments, their military forces increased dramatically. The breakdown of feudalism and the medieval chivalric code made warfare more competitive and egalitarian. It was an age of opportunity for rising European states.
Gustavus Adolphus, the King of Sweden, proved to be one of the most innovative military commanders of the period. Sweden couldn't hope to match the economic and manpower resources of the larger European powers. Therefore, Gustavus needed to maximize his combat power to achieve initial military victories that might preclude Sweden's involvement in a protracted war.
He was particularly interested in developing light, mobile Field Artillery that could keep up with the infantry and cavalry. He sought to create a combined-arms team capable of providing decisive tactical success.
Gustavus reduced the weight of the pieces and standardized the caliber. He organized his fire support into functional units and assigned artillery to individual tactical formations. Gustavus also converted his gunners from craftsmen and hired teamsters into a regular branch of the army.
In 1631 in the Battle of Breitenfeld during the 30 Years War, Gustavus appeared to achieve his goal of overcoming the recognized deficiencies of the artillery system. During the battle, Gustavus' forces outflanked his opponent, the imperial Hapsburg Army. From this flank position, Swedish gunners fired on the imperial ranks using their own as well as captured enemy artillery. When Gustavus pressed his attack, the enemy broke and fled.
Despite his spectacular success at Breitenfeld, there was no broad attempt to imitate his tactical and materiel innovations. The obvious question is why? Perhaps, it's because the battle didn't validate Gustavus' concept. It's clear the Swedes outgunned the imperial forces; yet, artillery's role may not have been decisive.
Raimondo Montecuccoli, a soldier and military scholar who participated in the battle, took little note of Gustavus' innovations. In his writings, Montecuccoli's recommendations on the employment of artillery focused on engaging the enemy at the maximum range and continually harassing him until the battle was joined by infantry and cavalry (extending the killing range).
He doesn't suggest that artillery be assigned to tactical units nor does Montecuccoli discuss the movement of artillery during the battle. In short, he offered nothing new.
How could such an astute observer of military operations have missed the innovations of Gustavus Adolphus? Perhaps, little effort was made to emulate Gustavus' ideas because neither Montecuccoli nor others saw them as important.
A number of factors may explain the practical limitations of Gustavus' concepts. The level of technology was certainly a drawback. To obtain light artillery that could be as mobile on the battlefield as tactical units, Gustavus experimented with a number of systems designed to lighten the weight of the tube by shortening the barrel and reducing its thickness.
Thinner tube walls required a lighter powder charge. The reduced charge resulted in significant decreases in accuracy and range. Gustavus' guns moved fast but did little damage.
In addition, another factor may have constrained innovation. The power of the state was on the rise; nevertheless, the European powers during the 30 Years War were strapped by social and economic dislocation, as well as the prohibitive cost of fighting a protracted war. States may have been reluctant to invest their strained resources on what they saw as unproven military concepts and marginal technologies.
18th Century Napoleonic Warfare
A century after Breitenfeld and generations before Napoleon, the Prussian king Frederick the Great experimented with the organization and employment of light field artillery similar to the concepts laid out by Gustavus. It was, however, only in the age of Napoleon that these innovations were broadly adopted by the European powers.
This was due in a large part to solving the technological dilemma of weight versus powder charge through improved gun foundry techniques. Accurate and uniform results were obtained by casting the gun as a solid piece and then boring the barrel out afterwards. The bored barrel resulted in a closer fit between the shot and tube wall. As a result, less gas escaped and a smaller powder charge was required. This allowed for thinner and lighter barrels without sacrificing range and accuracy.
By the 18th century, the power of the state caught up with technological progress. Governments exercised greater and more efficient control over society. The ability to direct a significant percentage of their resources into military spending allowed them to develop more complex and expensive fire support systems. For example in France before the French Revolution, Jean Gribeauval designed and developed the artillery system that Napoleon employed throughout his campaigns.
Mobile, rapid-firing guns overcame many of the longstanding problems that restricted effective employment of field artillery. As a result, the Napoleonic period saw significant tactical innovation that attempted to exploit superior technology.
A century-long debate ensued on how best to employ the guns. Essentially tactics focused on answering two questions: (1) Where do we position the guns? and (2) What do we shoot at?
The requirement for tactical decisions on artillery employment during the course of a battle significantly changed the character of warfare. These combat decisions required a more sophisticated command and control network. The tactical problem of maximizing the combat power of fire support systems and maneuver units, effectively employing a combined-arms team, became apparent.
Variations in the employment of artillery by the European powers make an excellent case study in tactical innovation. These variations and the effects of artillery during the Napoleonic period are illustrated in the Battle of Waterloo in 1815.
For example, the French believed in massing their guns and concentrating fire on part of the line of an opposing force to open a gap for infantry forces to break through. The British, on the other hand, spread their artillery throughout the formation to reinforce the firepower of infantry units.
In either case, the gunners were able to inflict severe casualties. The artillery could easily outrange the effective fire of infantry smooth-bore muskets. This factor — combined with the rapid rate of fire of the guns, improved aiming mechanisms and ancillary equipment and the variety of munitions available — gave the artillery a distinct firepower advantage against infantry formations.
19th Century: American Civil War
In the aftermath of Waterloo, military theorists attempted to distill the lessons of Napoleonic warfare. Preeminent among them was Antoine-Henri Jomini. A former staff officer for Napoleon, Jomini paid particular attention to the employment of artillery. He advocated using cannon as part of a combined-arms team. Jomini believed the guns equally formidable in the offense and defense.
During the Mexican-American War (1846-1848), the U.S. found light-horse artillery was even capable of offensive action independent of other arms. "Flying batteries" fought from exposed forward positions, sometimes within range of enemy musket fire.
Employing grape and canister in rapid fire and using quick displacement, artillery was able to break up attacks, protect flanks or conduct an offensive rush. As a result, artillery tactics were recognized in both theory and practice as an important element in any battle plan.
The industrial revolution and the development of the professionally educated officer corps further enhanced the evolution of the artillery system. During the American Civil War, the North had a well-developed industrial base that could mass-produce standardized weapons and ammunition.
At the same time, two exceptional West Point-educated Army officers, Majs. William Barry and Henry Hunt, set about building a functional fire support system. Tasked with organizing the artillery for the Army of the Potomac, they standardized battery drill, discipline, equipment and tactics and restructured logistics to support a high rate of ammunition consumption.
Hunt also created an artillery reserve — a separate artillery force that could be employed throughout the battle by the artillery commander to provide massed artillery fires. In short, military professionals combined concepts of artillery tactics and organization distilled from the Napoleonic age and America's recent military experience with the war-potential of an emerging industrial state.
Despite the accomplishments of Hunt and Barry, the battle of the Blue versus Gray soon proved that technology had altered the face of battle in unanticipated ways. In particular, artillery lost its utility in the offensive role.
During the Civil War, the rifled musket came into common use. Rifling created a tighter fit between the projectile and tube wall. Therefore, less gas escaped and the projectile was fired with superior range and power. In addition, the spin initiated by the rifling gave the round greater accuracy.
As a result, the flying batteries employed during the Mexican-American War proved ineffective. Riflemen could now outrange the effects of canister and pick off an artillery crew before it could unlimber its gun.
While the firepower of the infantry increased dramatically, the technology of smooth-bore artillery changed little in the generation from Waterloo to the Battle of Malvern Hill in 1862. Attempts were made to adopt rifling technology to artillery weapons. The Army of the Potomac, for example, employed three standard weapon systems. The Napoleon 12-pdr. had a traditional smooth-bore, direct-fire gun design. But the Union also fired the 10-pdr. Parrot rifle and 3-Inch Ordnance Rifle.
Employment of the rifled guns remained controversial throughout the war. Though they had greater range and accuracy, many believed that both the guns and the exploding shell they fired were unreliable. Also, the rifled guns could not fire canister (fragments would have scarred the rifling). Canister had proven to be the most effective ammunition against the Confederates' massed infantry assaults.
In addition, many doubted the worth of the extended range of rifled guns in the heavily forested and rolling terrain of the Eastern United States. The use of cannons appeared limited.
The Union preferred to use the tactical defense in which artillery could fight from prepared positions protected from Confederate small-arms fire. The skillful use of prepared positions and the coordinated employment of massed fire support enabled Hunt to balance the strengths and weaknesses of the Union artillery.
At Malvern Hill, the last major battle of McClellan's peninsular campaign, Hunt's cannons overwhelmed an attacking Confederate force. The rifled guns in the artillery reserve fired at long range to destroy enemy cannons and disrupt attack formations. At short range, the smooth-bore Napoleons opened up, firing canister like giant shotguns. At the day's end, 5000 Confederate infantrymen lay dead or wounded on the slopes surrounding the Union position. Artillery made the Union the master of the tactical defense.
Quick Fire and World War I
The full extent to which the tactical defensive would dominate the battlefield didn't become apparent until World War I. Union victories like Malvern Hill surprised no one. That artillery could be useful in defending a well-prepared position was nothing new — artillery had been defending and knocking down fortifications since the Middle Ages.
But the idea that rifled weapons could make future wars look like a medieval siege was not seriously considered. The slug-fests of the American Civil War did not reflect the shape of modern combat anticipated by most military thinkers. As a result, they dismissed the war as an aberration.
Still the impact of rifling technology wasn't completely ignored. In the last half of the 19th century, Europeans participated in numerous small wars from the Crimea to Manchuria. These experiences witnessed some changes in tactics and technology.
European armies adopted rifled infantry arms, and artillery accommodated itself to the changing battlefield by shifting from a direct to an indirect fire support system. This innovation was driven by both the difficulty in assaulting prepared positions defended by rifled weapons and the application of new technology for artillery.
The development of quick-fire artillery employed a number of technological advances, including breech-loading mechanisms, recoil systems, fast-burning smokeless powder and reliable high-explosive rounds. These innovations allowed guns in concealed positions to provide rapid and accurate long-range fires on targets.
However, these new capabilities also made new demands on the artillery. Higher rates of fire and a more complex support system increased logistical requirements. In addition, with the target out of sight of the gunner, fire direction and fire support coordination became an increasingly complex task. In short, changes in the artillery system increased firepower and survivability but at the cost of added complexity and an increased requirement for combat resources.
Despite innovation, artillery alone proved unable to break the tactical defensive's strangle hold on combat. The combination of entrenched fortifications, machine guns and defensive artillery fires exposed the frailty of the artillery system in an offensive role.
Many of the shortcomings of the system were readily apparent in the British offensive during the Battle of the Somme in 1916. The British bombarded the German trenches for seven days, firing 1,500,000 shells (about 30 shells per square yard). When the British troops went over the top, however, they found the German defenses as formidable as ever.
The British had underestimated the requirement for heavy artillery to breach prepared defenses and the ability of seasoned German troops to withstand the psychological effects of a prolonged bombardment. British losses in the campaign were 420,000 — a sad testament to the failure to fit fire support to the face of battle.
World War II
America's late entry into World War I allowed little time for the development of a "Yankee" artillery system. In fact, it was not uncommon for U.S. divisions to go into battle without American artillery in support.
The aftermath of the war was little better. The economic realities of the inter-war years allotted meager funds to develop and purchase artillery. In addition, some military thinkers argued that even this money was wasted. Airpower and armor would dominate future battlefields. The tank and the dive-bomber offered new direct-fire weapons that could restore mobility to the battlefield without fire support.
As a result, America's entry into World War II found the U.S. outranged and outgunned. The restoration of mobility to the battlefield during World War II, rather than signaling the end of artillery, allowed guns to exploit the offensive potential of indirect fire support.
Americans quickly discovered artillery fulfilled many requirements for combined-arms operations that airpower and armor couldn't. Unlike close air support, artillery could operate 24-hours-a-day under any weather conditions. It was also far easier to coordinate and more responsive to calls for fire from maneuver units.
Its advantage over tanks was the ability to shift and mass fires on targets beyond the line of sight. Artillery also held an inherent advantage in survivability when firing in the indirect role. In addition, Americans also found that even a "maneuver" war contained its share of static battles, such as attacks against well-defended cities like Metz and Nancy.
Artillery still played its traditional roles of defending and attacking fixed fortifications, occasionally even being employed in a direct-fire role. Requirements were quickly established for mechanized light and heavy artillery pieces to perform a range of complex fire support tasks.
By the time the American Third Army broke out of the Normandy beachhead to launch the Lorraine Campaign across central France in 1944, the quantity and quality of American artillery support offered U.S. forces a distinct battlefield advantage. The mechanization of artillery ensured that fire support was as mobile as the maneuver force.
The capabilities of the system were further expanded by tactical and materiel innovations, including the use of radio, ground and air observers, survey, fire control equipment and new fire direction procedures. These changes created fire coordination and command and control systems that could mass and shift artillery fires, as well as provide timely and responsive fire support to maneuver units throughout the area of operation.
While the Lorraine Campaign illustrated the flexibility and effectiveness of U.S. artillery, it also offered examples of a growing concern in the employment of fire support. As the complexity of the system grew, the danger of ... casualties from friendly fire increased. As in the past, innovation brought not only new capabilities, but also new requirements and concerns.
The Korean War
From the military point of view, Korea was really two wars. Commanders found the first phase from the outbreak of the war in June 1950 to the summer of 1951 comfortably reminiscent of American combat actions in World War II. However after a seesaw battle across the rocky peninsula, the opposing armies stalemated roughly along the original international boundary. What followed, the second phase, lasted until the armistice of July 1953.
This war more closely resembled the trench combat of World War I than the sweep and dash of the Third Army. Both sides fought from well-prepared bunker and trench positions, scrapping for bits of turf as the negotiations dragged on at Panmunjom. In short, in Korea the artillery was forced to recall the lessons of both world wars.
While the Korean War saw little revolutionary development in the fire support system, the historical accounts of a few battles from this almost forgotten war provide excellent case studies for examining artillery at the unit level. Though the artillery battery as a tactical unit existed from the age of Napoleon, it only has been since World War II that the organization became truly autonomous.
It performed its own operational functions (e.g., logistics, security, reconnaissance and survey) separate from the maneuver combat forces, while at the same time provided continuous fire support to the ground commanders. These requirements posed a severe test for organization, doctrine, logistics, combat leadership and technology.
The defense of battery positions at Haman and Kunu-ri in 1950 and 1951 illustrates the problems of protecting the artillery system from ground attack. Artillery action at Kunu-ri highlights the challenges of coordinating the movements of maneuver and fire support units on a crowded battlefield.
For the second phase of the war, the battles around Pork Chop Hill in 1953 underscore the use and limitations of employing artillery in static battles. In addition, the account of the Battle for Arsenal Hill demonstrates how the effectiveness of the artillery system has become dependent on the ability of the forward observer to direct fire.
Vietnam
Vietnam was America's first major "war without fronts." Attacks could be expected from any direction in strengths ranging from harassment by an individual sapper to attacks by conventional main-force units.
To counter this threat, U.S. ground forces tried to defeat the enemy by exploiting the Americans' inherent advantage in mobility and firepower. This required deploying forces widely to locate the enemy. Once we "fixed" an enemy, commanders would rapidly build up a preponderance of combat power by employing helicopters, artillery and air support.
For the artillery, the intimate relationship between fire support and maneuver elements meant batteries had to be as mobile and responsive as the supported units. The solution adopted was the fire support base. This base was essentially a small fort that could be established anywhere to deliver indirect fire support for maneuver operations and, at the same time, provide its own security.
Establishing these bases increased the independence of the artillery as a tactical unit as well as the scope of its responsibilities. Decentralization placed innovative and competent small-unit leadership at a premium as commanders faced a variety of new concerns.
The Ia Drang Campaign of 1965 produced the first major battles between the North Vietnamese Army and American forces. It tested American tactics and fire support procedures employed throughout the war. During this campaign, the Battle of Landing Zone (LZ) X-Ray illustrates the techniques of employing artillery fires and provides an opportunity to evaluate their effectiveness. On the other hand, the Battle at LZ Bird in 1966 provides a detailed look at the problems of defending the artillery system in a war without fronts.
Employing artillery during the Vietnam War remains a controversial topic. Some critics argue that American forces relied too heavily on firepower to the exclusion of maneuver. They suggest the U.S. squandered massive amounts of resources on a fire support system that produced little results.
Others suggest the American experience in Vietnam is unique, not to be duplicated in future wars. Therefore, they argue Vietnam holds few lessons for the artillery. Both these conclusions require analysis and debate, particularly since the Army is revitalizing its capability to fight a low-intensity war with the creation of light infantry divisions.
History and Future War
Studying military history is incomplete if a soldier doesn't apply his broadened horizons and new-found analytical skills to the study of contemporary problems. Currently units wage combat back and forth across the sands of the NTC [National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California] in a quest to capture the "face" of future battles.
Though the effects of artillery are poorly simulated at the NTC, the challenges and reality of coordinating close fire support on the modern battlefield are readily apparent. A historical analysis of operations at the center can increase our understanding of the dynamics of the present fire support system.
A study of future war, however, must also consider factors that Americans have not experienced on past battlefields or at the NTC. Artillery and missile units face new threats in the shape of advanced chemical weapons, tactical missiles, electronic warfare and nuclear weapons. In addition, they'll be targeted by special forces and air attack at a level never before experienced in previous wars. The requirement for joint coordination to employ air and ground fire support systems to fight the close, deep and rear battles adds new dimensions to battle.
Finally, we must balance these threats and missions against the enhanced technology we're employing to upgrade NATO delivery, survey, command and control and target acquisition systems. With this enhanced technology, we're trying to provide the robust fire support capability required to support AirLand Battle doctrine.
What role does historical analysis play in understanding future battle? It increases our ability to understand the forces of change. History demonstrates that the "unknown" of battle is really a failure to perceive the impact of various factors on our system.
The greatest value of historical study for Redlegs is to help train our minds to recognize these effects and develop creative solutions to the tactical problems of fire support. The challenge is to anticipate and shape the face of future war.
Bibliography for Field Artillery battle study listed in order of the time periods discussed:
Companion reference for all topics: Dupuy, R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy. The Encyclopedia of Military History. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.
Keegan, John. Face of Battle. New York: Vintage Books, 1977.
Carafano, James Jay. "On Teaching War," "Forward Observer" newsletter (September-October, 1986): Pages 10-13.
Nye, Roger. The Challenge of Command, Reading for Military Excellence. Wayne, New Jersey: Avery, 1986.
Roberts, Michael. Gustavus Adolphus, A History of Sweden 1611-1632. Vol. 2. New York: Longmans, 1958.
Rothenberg, Gunther. "Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Montecuccoli and the Military Revolution of the 17th Century," Makers of Modern Strategy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986.
Parker, Geoffrey. The Military Revolution, Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500-1800. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Mercer, Cavalie. Journal of the Waterloo Campaign. London: Greenhill Books, 1985.
Hughes, B.P. Open Fire, Artillery Tactics from Marlborough to Wellington. Chichester: Anthony Bird, 1983.
Hughes, B.P. Firepower Weapon Effectiveness on the Battlefield 1630-1850. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974.
Jomini, Antoine Henri. The Art of War. 1838 Translation by G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill. Reprint, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971.
Shy, John. "Jomini," Makers of Modern Strategy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986.
McWhiney, Grady and Perry D. Jamieson. Attack and Die, Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage. Birmingham, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1982.
Morelock, Jerry D. "Wait for the Wagon! Combat Service Support for the Civil War Battery," Field Artillery Journal (March-April 1986): Pages 14-19.
Tyndale-Briscoe, Julian. Gunner-Subaltern. London: Lee Cooper, 1971.
Bidwell, Shelford, Gunners at War, A Tactical Study of the Royal Artillery in the 20th Century. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1970.
MacDonald, Charles B. and Sidney T. Mathews. Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo and Schmidt. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1952.
Cole, Hugh. The Lorraine Campaign. Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, 1950.
Green, Constance McLaughlin, Harry C. Thompson and Peter Roots. The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955.
House, Jonathan M. Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th Century Tactics, Doctrine and Organization. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 1984.
Shrader, Charles R. Amicicide: The Problem of Friendly Fire in Modern War. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1982.
Marshall, S.L.A. Pork Chop Hill. New York: Morrow, 1956.
Gugler, Russell A. Combat Actions in Korea. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1970.
Doughty, Robert A. The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 1979.
Marshall, S.L.A. "On Heavy Artillery: American Experiences in Four Wars," Parameters (June 1978): Pages 2-20.
Marshall, S.L.A. Bird: The Christmastide Battle. New York: Cowles, 1968.
Allbright, John, John A. Cash and Allen W. Sandstrum. Seven Firefights in Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1970.
Dodge, Griffin N. "Fire Support in an Airmobile Environment: Some Lessons for Everyone," "Forward Observer" newsletter (June 1988): Pages 8-11.
Scales, Robert H. Jr. Firepower in Small Wars. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, forthcoming.
Scales, Robert H. Jr., "Firepower and Maneuver in the Second Indochina War," "Field Artillery" (September-October 1986): Pages 47-53.
Carafano, James Jay. "Letters from Vietnam," "Field Artillery" (October 1987): Pages 25-34.
Carafano, James Jay. "Fortresses and Firepower in Vietnam," "Field Artillery" (August 1988): Pages 37-42.
Scales, Robert H. Jr.. "Drumbeat for Maneuver Could Muffle Firepower," "Army" (December 1986): Pages 24-32.
Bolger, Dan. Dragons at War. Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1986.
Romjue, John L. From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: the Development of Doctrine 1973-1982. Fort Monroe, Virginia: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984.