This report of the 1864 operations in Mobile Bay was published as part of the series on Civil War coast defense in the Journal of the United States Artillery, Vol. 41, No. 3, May-June 1914.
After the surrender of the lower forts on the Mississippi River, resulting in the subsequent surrender of New Orleans, Admiral Farragut asked the Navy Department to be allowed to move against Mobile and close its harbor to the Confederates.
The Federal Government, however, was far more anxious to gain control of the Mississippi River, so ordered Farragut to go up that river and combine with the fleet then under Admiral Foote, which, was done, but, due to lack of cooperation on the part of the Army, left no lasting results.
The Mississippi River was not under Federal control till after the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, July, 1863.
In the meantime, the Confederates at Mobile were left free, except, perhaps, when some blockade runner fell into the hands of the blockading fleet. And as the Confederates kept on strengthening their batteries and building up an ironclad force, delay simply meant, of course, that an ever increasingly formidable force would be required when the Federals should finally move against Mobile.
But when the ironclads of the Federals were ready to attack, they were diverted for a time for use at Charleston harbor; so the attack on Mobile, which had been in contemplation since 1862, did not assume definite shape till the middle of 1864.
Had operations been undertaken promptly, as Admiral Farragut desired; the entrance into the bay would have been effected with much less cost in men and material, and Mobile would undoubtedly have fallen a year earlier than it did; and, as a result, the disaster of the Red River Expedition of 1864 might have been averted.
In 1864 Mobile was a most important point for the Confederacy; in fact, it was the only important harbor left to it on the Gulf of Mexico, now that New Orleans had been lost.
Due to military operations elsewhere, especially the Red River Expedition, no Federal troops were available to cooperate with the Navy, until the latter part of 1864; and as Atlanta had by this time been taken and the march to Savannah decided upon, the movement against Mobile was, as has been well said by Commander Rodgers of the Navy in his Study of Attacks upon Fortified Harbors (Artillery Notes No. 28), not a step in a series of operations, but only an isolated operation, but none the less of great importance, having in view, as it did, the stopping of blockade running from that port and the breaking up of the ironclad fleet which was being built there and of which so much was expected.
Mobile lies at the head of a bay that is 24 miles long and, in its upper part, 10 miles wide, expanding to 20 miles at its southern end. The upper anchorage has only 12 feet, and the lower 18 to 20 feet of water, the latter being five miles north of Mobile Point, or the main entrance to the bay.
The entrance lies between two narrow sand spits and is approached by a channel running north and south. This channel is 5 miles long and only half a mile wide at its narrowest point, and has at its southern extremity a bar over which there is a depth of nearly 21 feet. The northern end of the channel of approach, and the entrance to the bay, was protected by two forts — Forts Morgan and Gaines.
There was also a channel to the westward, north of Dauphin Island, on which was Fort Gaines, running from Mississippi Sound into Mobile Bay; there Fort Powell was located. Still another channel was to the northwest. These channels had but little water and were comparatively unimportant, though of some use to the lighter blockade runners.
Fort Morgan, an old fashioned, pentagonal, brick work, mounting its guns in three tiers, was the principal defense of the bay, for the main ship channel passed close under its guns.
It was situated on Mobile Point, on the right-hand side of the channel, entering the harbor. Its scarp brick wall was four feet eight inches thick, and its entire front was protected by an enormous pile of sand bags. This work was built on the site of an old work of the War of 1812, and at the time in question had the following armament: seven 10-inch smooth bore guns; three 8-inch smooth bore guns; 22 32-pdr., smooth bore guns; two 8-inch rifled guns; two 6.5-inch rifled guns; four 5.82-inch rifled guns.
The exterior batteries (Batteries Gee and Bragg) had the following: four 10-inch columbiads; one 8-inch rifled gun; two 32-pdrs., rifled.
In the fort 16 guns bore upon the land approaches, counting those on the retired flank at the light house. There were no guns in embrasures, and no parados, as the width of the terreplein did not permit. The guns were pretty well protected by traverses against fire from the water, but not from land.
Within the fort was a citadel, loop-holed for musketry, having brick walls some four inches thick.
The fort was commanded by Brigadier General Page and had a garrison of 640 men.
Fort Gaines, a brick fort on Dauphin Island, was on the left of the channel, built on the ruins of old Fort Tombigbee, and its armament consisted of: three 10-inch columbiads; four 32-pdr. rifled guns; and some 20 smooth bores, 32-, 24-, and 18-pdrs.
Of these guns some 11 bore on land.
This work was commanded by Colonel Anderson, who had 864 men.
Fort Powell, a minor work, had one 10-inch columbiad, one 8-inch columbiad, four rifled guns,
The rear of this work was unfinished and all of its guns bore on the sound and the channel. Its garrison consisted of about 100 men, there being two companies and a light battery.
Besides the three forts there were other elements of defense. From Fort Gaines there ran out to the edge of the channel, a line of obstructions consisting of a double line of piles, the heads of which were just visible at low water, preventing even light draught vessels from entering the bay. From the end of the piling a triple line of fixed mines closed the main channel, nearly up to Fort Morgan, leaving clear a narrow passage close to the fort, for blockade runners. This passage was not much over 100 yards from the beach.
The deep-water end of the line of mines was marked by a red buoy, and was 226 yards from the water battery of Fort Morgan.
Of these mines, 46 consisted of lager-beer kegs, filled with powder, fitted with wooden cones on the ends to keep them from tumbling over, and armed with four or five sensitive primers fastened to the upper side, to be exploded on a vessel's striking them.
One hundred thirty-four mines were made of tin in the form of truncated cones, having the upper diameter the greater and divided into two parts, the upper part being an air chamber and the lower part containing the powder charge. They were all anchored with old grate bars, and were arranged to be exploded by passing vessels' knocking off cast-iron caps, which actuated triggers.
These mines were all of the floating type, and were about seven feet below the water. There were also said to be electrical mines, called submarine mortar batteries. Three of these were in the channel, having a charge of some 1500 pounds of powder and being about 30 to 35 feet below the surface.
Inside the harbor, under cover of the forts, were three wooden gunboats and the iron ram Tennessee, one of the most formidable ships the Confederates had ever built.
The gunboats, unarmored, except around engines and boilers, were the following: The sidewheel steamer Morgan, two 7-inch rifled guns, four 32-pdrs. The sidewheel steamer Gaines, one 8-inch gun, five 32-pdrs. The Selma, an open deck steamer, one 6-inch smooth bore shell gun, two 9-inch smooth bore shell guns, one 8-inch smooth bore shell gun. This vessel was a heavily built steamer, but the two first mentioned were wholly unsuited for war purposes.
The ram Tennessee was of the Merrimactype, but further improved. She was 209 feet over all and 48 feet on the beam, and drew 13 feet. Her casemate stood 8 feet above the deck, was amidships, and sloped at an angle of 33 degrees; it was armored with 5-inch iron plating on the sides and 6-inch at the forward end.
The armament consisted of two 7-inch Brooke rifles, one in the bow and one in the stern, and two 6.4-inch rifled guns on each broadside. Her greatest defect was low speed and exposed steering gear, the speed being only six knots, and the steering gear being outside the casemate. The crew consisted of 18 officers and 110 men.
The Federal fleet, under command of Admiral Farragut, consisted of vessels of various classes. There were the following:
Monitors: Tecumseh two 15-inch guns, Manhattan two 15-inch guns, Winnebago four 11-inch guns, Chickasaw four 11-inch guns.
Screw Sloops: Hartford 21 guns, Brooklyn 24 guns, Richmond 20 guns, Lackawanna 8 guns, Monongahela 8 guns, Ossipee 11 guns, Oneida 9 guns, Seminole 8 guns.
Double Enders: Octorara 6 guns, Metacomet 6 guns, Port Royal 6 guns.
Screw Steamer: Galena 10 guns
Gunboats - Kennebec 5 guns, Itasca 5 guns.
Other smaller vessels were off the harbor entrance on blockade duty, but had little part in the engagement.
The land forces, under immediate command of Major-General Granger, consisted of a mixed force of infantry and artillery with a small amount of cavalry, the effective strength being about 5500 men. Of this force some 1500 took part in the siege of Fort Gaines and some 2000 later took part in the attack on Fort Morgan; but the rest were diverted to other purposes and subsequently detached, which, as we shall see, materially changed the plan of operations adopted.
Narrative of Events
In the early years of the Confederacy, Mobile Bay was the scene of nothing more than attempts at blockade running, which in some cases resulted in minor engagements between the runners and the blockading vessels. But after the surrender of New Orleans, the Confederates expected Mobile to be the next point of attack; so they made strenuous preparations for it, building, in the early part of 1863, five gunboats, and, in the winter of 1863-64, the ram Tennessee.
In January 1864, Farragut, free from his duties on the Mississippi, made a reconnaissance of the forts at the mouth of the bay; and, finding present no Confederate vessels except one transport, he desired to be allowed to force the harbor entrance before the more powerful Confederate vessels could be finished and brought down to aid in the defense.
In the latter part of February, light draught vessels of the Federal squadron attempted to enter Mobile Bay from Mississippi Sound; but, as the vessels could not get within effective range of Fort Powell, they returned after several shots had been exchanged.
In July, several expeditions were carried out: a blockade runner was beached under the guns of Fort Morgan and burned; and many night searching parties were sent out by the Federal fleet in attempts to locate and pick up mines, or torpedoes, as they were then called.
On May 18, Admiral Buchanan, commanding the Confederate naval forces at Mobile, planned to make a surprise night attack on the blockading vessels; but, due to various mishaps, it was daylight before the Tennessee came down the bay, and as she was then recognized by the Federal fleet, no attack was made. At the next tide she was floated farther down the channel and anchored under the guns of Fort Morgan, where she remained till the 5th of August.
Toward the end of July, plans of operations for the Federal forces were agreed upon between General Canby and Admiral Farragut. Farragut's plan was to pass up the channel close under the guns of Fort Morgan, destroy the Confederate naval forces, and support the Army, which, in the meantime, was to land and invest all three forts at once, without undertaking siege operations.
That plan, however, had to be changed, as General Canby was obliged to detach a force to protect Washington; so a second plan was adopted at the suggestion of Admiral Farragut. This contemplated that the military forces should land on Dauphin Island from Mississippi Sound, under cover of gunboats; and August 4th was selected as the date to begin operations.
This, however, was changed by circumstances. Admiral Farragut was required to postpone his operations 24 hours, waiting for the Tecumseh, a monitor, to come from Pensacola, in order the better to engage the Tennessee; while General Granger, in immediate command of the military forces, landed on Dauphin Island some seven miles from Fort Gaines, on the afternoon of the 3rd and immediately began its investment.
In this way, the attack on Fort Gaines opened the operations, and the Confederates, unhampered by a Federal naval force, rushed additional troops and supplies to the forts's assistance.
The works about Mobile were at that time the most formidable in the South.
The troops (about 1500) under General Granger immediately took up the advance, and by midnight of the 4th the light artillery was in position some 1200 yards from the fort, and the next morning opened up on the works simultaneously with the passage of the batteries by the fleet.
Turning our attention to the fleet, which now played the most important role, we learn that on the afternoon of August 4 Farragut, accompanied by the commanders of his vessels, ran into the harbor on a small tug to make a final inspection of the defenses. About this time two Confederate transports came down the bay and began landing troops and provisions at Fort Gaines.
These vessels were driven up the bay by the Winnebago, which came up and opened fire. The tug returned and the various officers rejoined their vessels. Detailed orders were issued by Farragut for the attack to be made the next morning. Vessels were ordered to move together in pairs, lashed together, the larger ship on the starboard side, so in case one was disabled, the other could be depended upon for motive power.
The Brooklyn was paired with the Octorara, the Hartford with the Metacomet, the Richmond with the Port Royal, the Lackawanna with the Seminole, the Monongahela with the Kennebec, the Ossipee with the Itasca, and the Oneida with the Galena.
Admiral Farragut intended to lead with the Hartford; but, yielding to the solicitation of his officers, he consented to let the Brooklyn go ahead, as this vessel was fitted with an apparatus for catching torpedoes (mines) and also had four bow guns which could be used when approaching the Confederate works.
The monitors were to go in single file, a little ahead of the wooden ships, in the following order: Tecumseh, Manhattan, Winnebago, Chickasaw. They were to engage, and keep down the fire of, the water battery and parapet guns of the forts, as well as to attack the Confederate ram Tennessee, as soon as Fort Morgan had been passed.
Admiral Farragut planned to move past the forts, for, believing the mines planted in the channel were probably innocuous, having been some time in the water, he determined to take the chance.
In order to have rapid communication with the army forces ashore, signal officers of the Army were distributed among the principal vessels.
The steamers (Genesee, Pinola, Pembina, Sebago, Tennessee, and Bienville, not being part of the attacking fleet, were directed to take up a position southeast of Fort Morgan and to keep up a flank fire; but they were unable to get near enough to the work to take an important part in the action.
The fleet got under way at 5:30 a.m. crossed the bar at 6:30 a.m., and at 6:45 a.m. the Tecumseh fired the first two guns, one shell being seen to explode over Fort Morgan. For the time, there was no other firing. It was a clear day, the wind blowing towards the fort, and the tide coming in.
At 7:06 a.m. Fort Morgan opened fire. It was intended that the monitors should take the lead and draw the first fire of Fort Morgan. During this time the rest of the vessels kept coming on, the Brooklyn coming up to the monitors. At 7:10 a.m. the Brooklyn opened fire and the rest of the fleet followed as soon as their forward guns bore.
Ten minutes later the Confederate ram Tennessee came out. The Hartford did not open fire till five minutes after Fort Morgan, and it then engaged the fort, driving the Confederates away from their batteries by its broadsides, but they returned to their guns whenever opportunity presented. The light breeze at this time dying down, the smoke settled down around the vessels, and the gunners in the fort were unable to see them distinctly.
At 7:15 a.m. signal was made for closer order; and at 7:20 a.m. the larger vessels were busily engaged attacking with their broadsides, while the monitors ran under the guns of the fort, delivering a heavy fire. The Tecumseh struck a mine and sank in about 30 seconds, taking along almost its entire crew.
It was at this time that the Brooklyn slowed down, reported that mines were ahead, and apparently expected orders for its further action. The signal was received by the flag-ship: the Federal vessels were coming on, and in a very short while all would be in confusion immediately in front of the guns of Fort Morgan.
Admiral Farragut, seeing the conditions of affairs, turned to his pilot, asked if there was sufficient water ahead, and receiving an affirmative answer, gave the direction "Full speed ahead," and took the lead with his own vessel, thus straightening out his column, and preventing by his quick action what might have been disaster. The Hartford went right through the Confederate mine field, mines being heard striking the bottom and sides of the vessel, but fortunately none exploding.
It was 7:32 a.m., when the Hartford took the lead, and at 8:35 a.m., she anchored above the forts, the rest of the fleet being then in the harbor and out of range of the guns of Fort Morgan.
Before taking up the part played by Fort Morgan, let us turn our attention to the Confederate vessels previously mentioned.
As the Federal fleet came on, the monitors in single line ahead and the rest of the vessels paired in double line-ahead, about a quarter of a mile in rear of the monitors, signal was made by the Confederate ram Tennessee to get under way, and the Confederate vessels formed line-abreast towards the oncoming Federal fleet.
As the fleet was opposite Fort Morgan, the Tennessee, lying just beyond the line of torpedoes, approached and opened up on the leading vessel; she made an attempt to ram the Hartford, but, due to the latter's superior speed, the attempt failed.
The Tennessee then headed for the Brooklyn and failed again for the same reason — the Federal vessels, due to their superior speed, were able to outmaneuver their assailant. During this time, the three gunboats were closely engaged with the Federal fleet. The Gaines fought on till she was in a sinking condition, when she was run ashore near Fort Morgan; the Selma is said to have deserted the Gaines in the action, and surrendered later when another large vessel came on; and the Morgan managed to escape to Mobile.
Thus the Confederate gunboats were effectively disposed of by the superiority of fire of the Federal fleet, leaving at this time the Tennessee still to he put out of action. The coupled ships were unlashed and the final engagement begun. The ships in this encounter suffered far more than when they ran by the forts.
All vessels that could get to her attacked the ram, and she was rammed some six or eight times, but without much effect. Whole broadsides of 9-inch and 10-inch guns were fired at her, some at point blank ranges 3 to 30 yards away; and, finally, Admiral Buchanan being wounded, the rudder chains carried away, the smoke stack knocked off, and the shutters of gun ports jammed by a 15-inch shell fired from the Manhattan, the Tennessee surrendered, about 10 a.m. This fight had lasted about three-quarters of an hour.
Turning now to the part the forts took in this naval action, we find that Fort Gaines played but a small part.
Fort Powell was abandoned the night following the fleet's entrance into the harbor, after having been bombarded in the afternoon at 2:30 p.m. by the Chickasaw. It had taken but a minor part in the action and its position had become untenable.
Fort Morgan bore the brunt of the attack by the monitors and the 14 other vessels, whose total broadside was approximately 75 guns. In the fleet's approach some 30 bow guns were available. Although the fleet had actually 199 guns, only part of them could be brought into play.
A broadside fire maintained by the fleet so far silenced the fort that its guns did comparatively little injury during the run-by. But after the ships had passed, the guns were manned again and opened up with a furious cannonade. It was at this time that the Brooklyn, mistaken for the Hartford, had the fort's fire concentrated on her, and was struck some 30 times in the hull and rigging.
The fleet was in effective range of Fort Morgan for about one hour, and during this time the fort fired 491 projectiles, or an average of eight per minute. The monitors closing in on the fort were severely handled, the Winnebago being hit some 19 times.
The Oneida and the vessel with her also suffered severely from the fort's fire, being raked fore and aft. The Oneida had her boilers shot through.
The fire of the forts did not, however, stop the fleet; nor, on the other hand, were they disposed of by the fleet: both Fort Gaines and Fort Morgan were compelled to surrender only after having land forces brought against them.
The second part of the operations in Mobile Bay, the reduction of the forts, will now be taken up.
The first plan of operations contemplated a landing of 3000 men upon Mobile Point from the outside and opposite Pilot Town (three miles from Fort Morgan) simultaneously with the passage of the fleet into the bay. A sufficient force was to move immediately to a position at a certain range from Fort Morgan — a mile or three quarters — suitable for rifled guns and mortars, there intrench and open fire with available guns (eight 30-pdrs., six 3-inch Rodman guns, and two mortars), in cooperation with the fleet.
The remainder of the force was to intrench itself across the spit at Pilot Town against approaches from the mainland. A reserve of 1500 men with field artillery (rifled guns) was to he kept aboard ship in Mississippi Sound (inside Dauphin Island), with a view to some portion of it landing, if not required elsewhere, moving up and annoying Fort Gaines in conjunction with the fleet after its passage up the bay.
Thus with these dispositions, Forts Morgan, Gaines, and Powell could be separately and effectively invested. No siege, employing regular approaches and breaching batteries, was contemplated, for the means were not at hand; nor was it considered necessary.
It was found, however, that only 1500 men were available; so the following plan was adopted: the whole force, including all the artillery, was to land on Dauphin Island and go into position against Fort Gaines, as had been proposed against Fort Morgan, the fleet from the sound, from the bay (a portion then being in the bay), and from the anchorages outside, concentrating all their efforts against Forts Gaines and Powell; the fall of one of these works, or of both, would open up communication with the portion of the fleet inside and enable the Federals to enter the bay with troops, effect a landing at Pilot Town, and proceed against fort Morgan as originally contemplated.
A landing was made on Dauphin Island at 4 p.m., August 3; at 10 a.m., August 4 the line of sentinels was within 1200 yards of the fort; and at 4 p.m. work was commenced on a line of trenches, with batteries, across the island. During the night six 3-inch Rodman guns were put into position on the ridge of sand.
On the 5th, at sunrise, the fleet started on its way by the forts, and the 3-inch guns opened fire on Fort Gaines. The fort replied but did no damage.
After the fleet's entrance, and while it was engaged with the ram Tennessee, Fort Gaines opened up on it with two 10-inch columbiads which bore upon the scene of action; these, however, were soon silenced by the field guns from the sand hills, which took the columbiads in reverse and flank, they being protected by neither parados nor traverse.
On the 6th, the Winnebago approached within half a mile of Fort Gaines and fired upon it. Many of the shells burst over the fort, taking the opposite sides well in reverse, there being no parados nor traverse. The fort replied with its 10-inch gun, but did not hit the monitor. At night, Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned by the Confederates.
On the 7th, four 30-pdrs. and six field guns were nearly ready to fire and the infantry trench was nearly complete.
At 10 a.m., on the 8th, the fort surrendered. The garrison consisted of 818 officers and men. Its armament was found to be: four 10-inch columbiads, two 7-inch Brooke rifles, twelve 15 smooth bore 32-pdrs. and 24-pdrs. and five or six flank casemate howitzers.
Two 10-inch guns and six 24-pdrs. commanded the land approach.
There was an abundant supply of ammunition and rations for two months.
In the fort there was neither merlon, traverse, nor parados to protect the guns, nor splinter-proof for the personnel. It was utterly weak and ineffectual against the Federal attack, which could have taken all its fronts in front, enfilade, and reverse.
With the guns on the sand ridge before mentioned, every shot could have been placed upon the terreplein of the opposite fronts. This sand ridge afforded perfect cover up to a point 400 yards from the fort, its height varying from 15 to 30 feet, and the crest of the fort being 27 feet. The garrison had commenced four traverses, but had made little progress on them.
On August 9, Fort Gaines having surrendered, transports with 2000 troops and all available siege material were moved to Pilot Town and there landed, passing without interruption within two miles of Fort Morgan. The landing commenced about 11 a.m., and at 4 p.m. the advance was moved up and occupied a line 2000 yards from the fort. The outer batteries, Gee and Bragg, were abandoned by the Confederates.
A reconnaissance was made, and an abandoned line of trenches constructed by the Confederates and extending nearly across the island, was found. The terrain being favorable, it was decided to convert this, with but slight changes, into the first parallel and put into position there the 30-pdr. Parrott and other long range guns, although the distance (1400 yards) was somewhat greater than desirable. That night the advance occupied this trench. Work was now done bringing up the guns and mortars and selecting suitable positions for them.
On August 11, 12, and 13 the monitors Chickasaw, Winnebago, and Manhattan in turn came up at about 1800 to 2000 yards off the fort and fired shells, one every half hour during four or five hours in the morning and for the same length of time in the afternoon. Sometimes this firing was kept up during a part of the night.
On August 14, the siege gun battery on the left (Battery H) and two 30-pdr. Parrotts were ready to fire. The other batteries were ready for their platforms. Federal sharpshooters were occupying all the most advanced sand hills and in some cases were within 250 yards of the works. The fire of sharpshooters made it rather hazardous to serve the guns, which were not in embrasures.
At 6 a.m., fire was opened with the 30-pdrs. Three of the fort's barbette guns appeared to be dismounted and the parapet considerably injured by the previous bombardment of the monitors.
On August 15, work was commenced on Batteries A and B, and that night the second parallel was commenced, running from the left extremity of the sand ridge behind which the mortars had been located.
August 16, 12 additional siege mortars arrived, making 16 in all. These were to be located behind the sand hills near Batteries A and B. During the night the parallel was finished half way across the point. The fort kept up its fire, but did no particular damage.
On August 17, Battery G was completed for two 9-inch guns (Navy) and all guns mounted in other batteries were connected with the first parallel, except Battery F. Work on the second parallel was continued.
August 18, the second parallel was continued to P and a battery for two light 12-pdr. guns was located and commenced at 0. Two batteries for mortars were begun at E and K. Four 9-inch Navy guns were landed, and two of them placed in position at G. Platforms for 12 mortars were completed at A, B, C, D, and L and the mortars were mounted. There was no annoyance from the fort.
On August 21, magazines, platforms, and batteries for all guns and mortars on hand were completed and everything was ready for opening fire. At 8:45 that night the fort commenced firing, hut there was no response from the Federal siege guns.
The monitors maintained their positions as before, firing an occasional shell into the fort.
At daylight, August 22, fire was opened up by the Federal siege batteries consisting of: four 9-inch Dahlgrens, eight 30-pdr. Parrotts, four light 12-pdrs., two 3-inch Rodmans, twelve 10-inch siege mortars, four 8-inch siege mortars.
The Monitors Manhattan, Chickasaw, Winnebago, and the captured ram Tennessee (eight 7-inch rifles) fired at the fort at short range, while the rest of the fleet fired at long range with large rifled guns.
The fire was accurate. The mortars fired at first once every 15 minutes, slackening down at noon and resuming near sundown. No artillery was fired from the fort; two volleys of musketry were fired from the southeast salient of the covered way, but this was soon silenced by the Federal fire. Some of the light guns were moved up nearer to the fort.
At night an approach zigzag was started from the left extremity of the second parallel, but was not run to any distance on account of rain and mud. About 9 p.m. that night a conflagration broke out in the fort and the Federal artillery fire, which had practically ceased at night fall, was resumed.
It is estimated that in the last 12 hours of the siege 3000 projectiles were thrown into and around the work.
On August 23, at 6 a.m., there was an explosion in the fort; at 7 a.m. a white flag was flying, and surrender was arranged for 2 p.m. The conflagration of the night before was still burning; it was in the barracks which were in ruins, nearly all the wood work having been burned out.
The scarp and parapet of the fort were much torn up by the shells fired by the Navy. No casemate arches were broken, nor any magazines injured. The carriages of the 8-inch and 10-inch columbiads situated in front of the 3-inch rifles (Federal) were broken. Twelve of the barbette guns were disabled.
Of the ammunition on hand there were found 250 rounds per gun, except in the case of the flank howitzers, for which there were but 50. The powder was practically all destroyed.
The efficiency of the land defense was much reduced due to the fact that the Federals could approach under perfect cover to within 500 yards of the fort behind the sand hills along the north shore and behind the ridge near the south shore, and there very easily establish batteries. Moreover, the guns could not be worked owing to the sharpshooters firing from the Federal works.
Fort Morgan surrendered, as General Page, its commander, in his report states, because the parallels of the Federals had reached the glacis, because the walls had been breached, because all the guns save two had been disabled, because the woodwork of the citadel had been set on fire by shells of the Federals, thereby endangering the magazines, and because all powder had been destroyed by flooding, for fear of the magazines being bombarded.
In the surrender were included some 600 prisoners and 60 pieces of artillery of various kinds.
In these attacks, there was no immediate expectation of moving on the City of Mobile, which was safe, by reason of a solid row of piling and mines across the river three miles below the city; nor could the larger vessels get within three miles of the city on account of shallow water. But by the operations in the lower bay Mobile was effectually closed as a port for blockade runners, although the city itself was not taken till later.
Ammunition and Casualties
The Hartford expended a little over 200 rounds; the Brooklyn, 183; the Richmond, 193; the Lackawanna, 105; the Monongahela, 99; the Ossipee, 93; the Octorara, 8; the Seminole, 36; the Kennebec, 33; and the Monitors Manhattan, Winnebago, and Chickasaw, 11, 56, and 183 respectively. For other vessels the expenditure is not definitely stated.
The hits on the vessels were as follows: Hartford 20, Brooklyn 30, Octorara 11, Lackawanna 5, Kennebec 2, Galena 7, Manhattan 9, Winnebago 19, Chickasaw 3, Metacomet 11, Ossipee 4, Itasca 1.
The Tecumseh was sunk, as was also the Philippi. Others escaped with but minor damage.... [Fifty-two were killed and 170 wounded.] This does not include the loss due to the sinking of the Tecumseh.
It is noted that of the above casualties more are to be attributed to the action with the Tennessee than to the fire of the batteries of the forts.
On the Confederate side the Tennessee was struck 53 times, from 33 of which resulted penetrations of greater or less degree. She had 2 killed and 9 wounded. The Gaines was hit 17 times and had 2 killed and 3 wounded. The Selma had 10 killed and 16 wounded.
The casualties of the land forces, both Confederate and Federal, were very small. In the siege of Fort Morgan the Federals lost 1 killed and 7 wounded.
As to the expenditure of ammunition during the siege of Fort Morgan by the ironclads, we may take the data of the Manhattan for example, as follows:
Aug. 9, 10:30 a.m. to 1 p.m., 15 rounds at 1300 yards; Aug. 13, 7 to 9 p.m., 8 rounds at 1400 yards; Aug. 14, 2 to 4 a.m., 6 rounds at 1200 yards; Aug. 15, 2 to 5 a.m., 14 rounds at 1200 yards; Aug. 15, 7 to 10:30 p.m., 8 rounds at 1200 yards; Aug. 19, 6 rounds at 1200 yards; Aug. 22, 5 to 7:15 a.m., 13 rounds at 1200-1000 yards; Aug. 23, 10 to 11:30 a.m., 12 rounds at 1000 yards; and Aug. 23, 5:15 to 7: p.m., 18 rounds, surrender.
The fort, replying to this fire on the 9th, hit the monitor once; and replying on the 15th, had one shell burst over the deck. Further data are not available.
The besieging force fired as follows: Battery B 298 shells; Battery F 285 shells; Battery H 200 shells; and Battery K 223 shells.
There was, of course, more ammunition expended, but no further data are available.
Campaign Against Mobile
After the forts had been taken, operations in front of Mobile ceased. Then on Dec. 16, 1864, when Thomas had overthrown Hood at Nashville, he was ordered to follow Hood south; but in January this movement came to a stop at Eastport, due to the condition of roads. Subsequently General Grant ordered General Canby, then at New Orleans, to move against Mobile.
Meanwhile, the city had been further strengthened since the Battle of Mobile Bay, the preceding August, and was now defended by three main lines of fortification on the west side. General Canby, therefore, determined to attack from the east side, where, also, he might have the cooperation of the Navy. The principal works to be reduced were the Spanish Fort, commanding the mouth of the Appalachee, and Fort Blakely, commanding the head of the Appalachee, where the Tensas leaves it.
The movement was made in two columns — one from Dauphin Island under Canby, the other from Pensacola under Steele.
Canby's force was about 32,000, accompanied by a siege train; and Steele's force numbered about 13,000; so in all there was an attacking force of 45,000.
Mobile was held by a force, under General Maury, of an approximate strength of 10,000, with some 300 field and siege guns: There were also five Confederate gunboats.
Canby's advance began March 17, part of the troops, the 16th Corps coming from Fort Gaines, and the 13th Corps from Fort Morgan. These forces united near the mouth of the Fish River and began the siege of the Spanish Fort on March 27.
On the 8th of April, the trenches were well advanced and a bombardment was begun by 90 guns and joined in by all the Federal gunboats within range.
In the evening, a lodgement was effected on the right of the Confederate lines; and, during the night, the Confederate garrison made good its retreat with a loss of some 500 prisoners. Nearly 90 guns were left behind.
Steele's forces left Pensacola on March 20, and after a roundabout march of over 100 miles arrived before Fort Blakely on April 1, and at once began the siege. On the afternoon of the 9th, 28 guns were in position; and the Spanish Fort having fallen, the Confederate works were captured by a general assault made by 16,000 men. There were taken 3423 prisoners and more than 40 guns.
Forts Tracy and Huger, two small works, were abandoned and blown up on the night of the 11th.
The rivers were swept for torpedoes, and the fleet then gained the rear of Mobile by the Blakely and the Tensas. On the morning of the 12th General Granger crossed the bay under convoy of the Navy and entered Mobile. Maury had by this time marched out with the remainder of his force, some 4560 men and 27 field pieces, and retreated towards Meridian. Subsequently, this force, as part of the Confederate armies, was surrendered to General Canby, May 4, 1865, when the war was over.
The naval operations during this time supplemented those of the Army, keeping open a water line of communications reconnoitering the various bays. The Navy aided in the land operations with its fire when practicable, and also put ashore and manned some of its guns as siege batteries, as in the siege of the Spanish Fort. It shelled Batteries Huger and Tracy. The monitor fleet finally appeared in the river in rear of Mobile and helped to compel its surrender.
The Navy suffered its greatest loss from contact with mines. On March 28 the Milwaukee struck one, and sank in about three minutes; there was, however, no loss of life. On the 29th the Osage struck one and sank, with a loss of 5 killed and 11 wounded, due to the explosion.
On April 1 the Rodolph struck a mine, its loss being 4 killed and 11 wounded. Later in clearing the channels — where in one case 150 mines were taken out of the rivers — the tugs Ida and Althea and a launch were blown up, resulting in 8 killed and 5 wounded. On April 14, the gunboat Sciota was sunk by a mine, having 6 killed and 5 wounded.
In the attacks just described, we have one of the best examples of mutual dependence of the Army and Navy and of thorough understanding of each other's sphere, which contributed much to their successful issue.
The subordination of military affairs to those that may be called political, is brought out here; for had the Administration been able to see how easily the attack could be made, if made earlier, much would have been saved....