Operations On The Mississippi River; Federal Attempts To Capture Vicksburg
Fall 1999 - Vol 20, No. 4


This report of the operations on the Mississippi River in 1862-63 was published as part of the series on Civil War coast defense in the Journal of the United States Artillery, Vol. 41, No. 2, March-April 1914.

After the capture of Island Number Ten, April 8, 1862, the Federal forces under General Pope, embarked on transports, and, under the protection of Flag-Officer Foote's squadron, proceeded down the Mississippi River, arriving near Fort Pillow on the 14th of the month.

Plans were made for a joint military and naval attack to take place on the 17th; but that day General Pope received orders from General Halleck to proceed at once to Pittsburg landing, taking along his entire force; so he started that same afternoon. The withdrawal of the military forces at this point made, of course the projected attack impossible; so it was abandoned.

In the meantime the indecisive battle of Shiloh had been fought. The Confederate forces had been concentrating at Corinth; but, on Halleck's advancing towards that point, the Confederates fell back along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, evacuating Corinth May 30th.

Federal troops were now in possession of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at Corinth, and the Confederate position at and above Memphis, having been turned, was untenable. Fort Pillow was therefore abandoned on the night of June 4th and Fort Randolph the next day, the greater part of the garrison falling back on Vicksburg.

At Memphis, however, the Confederates had a strong fleet and before giving up that city determined to try conclusions with Foote's fleet, which during all this time had remained in the vicinity of Fort Pillow.

The Confederates hoped either to destroy this fleet or to cripple it. On the 9th of May Foote was relieved of command, on account of a wound received at Fort Donelson, and was succeeded by Commodore Davis.

On May 10th at 7 a.m., the Confederate fleet of eight vessels, coming out from under the guns of Fort Pillow, attacked the Federal fleet, then consisting of seven gunboats. A naval battle ensued: two of the Federal vessels were rammed and sunk, while the Confederate vessels were promptly disabled by the superior ordnance of the Federal fleet, four being rendered helpless.

At the end of an hour the Confederates withdrew to the fort, towing their disabled vessels with them, and subsequently went down the river. Fort Pillow was abandoned June 4th. Commodore Davis proceeded down the river and at dark the next day was within two miles of Memphis. At daylight, June 6th, the Confederate fleet was lying off Memphis, the fleet consisting of the same vessels that had been encountered off Fort Pillow, and another attack took place.

The Federal fleet now consisted of five vessels, having in all 68 guns, and 4 rams. The Confederates had eight vessels, but only 28 guns. At 4:20 a.m. the Federal fleet moved down the river and engaged the Confederate vessels in a running fight, which, when ended after an hour or so, had resulted in the destruction of three of the Confederate vessels and the capture of four, one only having escaped. The city of Memphis was surrendered and taken possession of by the Federal fleet.

Commodore Davis remained at Memphis till June 29th. During this time an expedition was sent up the White River destroying the Confederate works at St. Charles. On the 29th Commodore Davis left Memphis with four of his vessels, six mortar boats, and some transports; and on July 1st arrived at Young Point, a few miles above Vicksburg, where he joined forces with Farragut's fleet, which by this time had come up the river.

Before proceeding further in our account, let us look for a few minutes at Farragut's fleet. After the passage of the forts below New Orleans, the fleet arrived at New Orleans April 24-25, and then after a few days proceeded up the river. Baton was reached by Farragut's advanced division on May 18th.

The surrender of Vicksburg was demanded, but the demand was refused. A day or so later Farragut himself arrived with additional vessels and two transports carrying some 1500 men, part of General Butler's command brought up from New Orleans. A reconnaissance was made and a council of war held, decision being made against the proposition to run by the batteries, on account of the inadequate force available.

Nothing further was done at this time, Farragut returning to New Orleans June 1st, and the troops being sent back to Baton Rouge. On his arrival at New Orleans, Farragut found most urgent letters from the Navy Department impressing upon him the importance of clearing the Mississippi, only one point of which (Vicksburg) was at that time in the possession of the Confederates.

After Farragut's withdrawal a desultory bombardment was carried on by the naval vessels that remained near Vicksburg, while the Confederates were busily engaged building additional batteries and bringing in additional men. Farragut did not believe he could take Vicksburg without the aid of a large military force, yet he prepared as quickly as possible to make the attempt.

The mortar flotilla consisting of 16 vessels under Porter was sent on ahead and reached Vicksburg June 20th. On the same day Farragut left Baton Rouge with the large vessels of his fleet accompanied by transports carrying some 3000 men, consisting of four regiments of infantry and batteries.

This force reached Vicksburg June 25th, having stopped on the way near Natchez and Grand Gulf, to attack batteries that had been erected since the first expedition up the river. These works, however, were now abandoned on the approach of the fleet.

The entire fleet assembled at Vicksburg June 25 consisted of three ships, seven gun boats, carrying in all 106 guns, and 16 mortar boats, each having one 13-inch mortar.

The Confederate armament consisted of some 40 guns, the batteries being on bluffs about 200 feet high giving them a plunging fire upon the vessels.

Two ships and five gunboats of Farragut's fleet passed the batteries of Vicksburg early on the morning of June 28th, after an artillery duel lasting some two hours. As a result of the action, Farragut anchored with a portion of his fleet above the peninsula on which were the batteries of Vicksburg; while another portion was below. Farragut's loss was 15 killed and 42 wounded, and the damage to his fleet was not very serious.

The shore batteries suffered no losses and it was evident that the ships could do no real damage to them; but it is of interest to note that after the action Farragut stated that the forts could be passed again as often as might be required.

The fleets of Farragut and Davis now remained in the vicinity of Vicksburg, some above and some below the batteries; while the Confederates continued their work on the batteries, increasing the number at Vicksburg and also building some at Grand Gulf, 15 miles below.

On July 15, some light gunboats that had been sent up the Yazoo River on a reconnaissance to locate the whereabouts of the Confederate ram Arkansas, reported as under construction somewhere on the river, were seen coming back chased by the Arkansas, which deliberately kept on and passed through the Federal fleet, taking cover under the batteries of Vicksburg.

Because Farragut had not imagined that the Arkansas would venture near a formidable fleet of war vessels such as he then had, his vessels on this morning were without steam and unable to move, so he had to content himself with firing into the Arkansas as she went by. Chagrined, Farragut at once determined to run past the batteries again that night and destroy the ram. Accordingly, the run-by was made with a loss of five killed and 16 wounded; but owing to darkness and confusion no damage was done to the Arkansas.

The river was now beginning to fall and Farragut was becoming anxious about his large vessels, which drew considerable water. He feared that they would be unable to return to deep water. On July 20th, however, he received orders to return, and on July 22nd started down the river with his fleet and the troops he had brought up.

On the same day Davis with his fleet went up the river; so Vicksburg was left free.

On July 29th Farragut reached New Orleans again.

In all the engagements thus far, the Confederates had lost only 22 men killed and wounded.

On the 30th of July, they made an attack on Baton Rouge but were unsuccessful. Two days later, however, they gained possession of a point below the mouth of the Red River, Port Hudson, some 30 miles above Baton Rouge, where they immediately began to build heavy batteries. The works then established remained in possession of the Confederates till after the fall of Vicksburg nearly a year later.

The Federal troops had abandoned Baton Rouge and returned to New Orleans.

Thus the Federal forces let slip the chance to take and hold the river; because no troops appeared available, Halleck on June 28th informing Farragut that it would be impossible to detach troops to cooperate at Vicksburg. No further effort being made, the Confederates assembled additional troops, again assumed the offensive, and regained control of the Mississippi River from Baton Rouge to Helena, Ark., some 300 miles in a straight line and nearly 600 miles along the river.

Throughout this length they built batteries or strengthened them wherever the river touched the eastern bluffs — at Port Hudson, at Natchez, at Grand Gulf, at Vicksburg; and they built a battery (Fort Hindman) a short distance up the Arkansas River, under cover of which their gunboats were able to operate. In consequence, the Confederacy held on to the Mississippi for nearly another year.

The state of affairs on the Mississippi River having been recounted in general terms, it is obvious that the problem before the Federal Government was the reduction of Vicksburg, which it was thought could be accomplished best by way of the river, which afforded an easy line of communication under convoy of the Navy not so liable to serious interruption as a land line would be.

The Confederate line, of which Vicksburg was the center, had its right at Haynes' Bluff, a fortified position twelve miles from Vicksburg and near to and commanding the Yazoo, while its left was at Grand Gulf, some 60 miles below Vicksburg by river, though not over 30 miles by land.

There were for the Federals to consider, therefore, works at Haynes' Bluff, Grand Gulf, Port Hudson, and Vicksburg, primarily, and, secondarily, Fort Hindman on the Arkansas. The two most important points in the chain by means of which the Confederates held their section of the Mississippi, were Vicksburg and Port Hudson.

Vicksburg is 400 miles above New Orleans, and some 400 miles below Memphis. The river, after pursuing its irregular course through the low bottom lands, turns to the northeast five miles from the city, and on reaching the cliffs on which the city stands sweeps abruptly around and continues its course southwest, parallel to its original course, thus enclosing a narrow tongue of low land from three fourths to one mile wide.

The bluffs at their greatest elevation, just below the point where the river first touches them, are 260 feet high. The bluffs do not rise perpendicularly from the river. From the point of greatest elevation for a distance of some two miles, in the vicinity of Vicksburg, the crest of the bluffs lies fairly near the river, but below the city it gradually recedes, at the same time that its elevation diminishes to about 150 feet.

This position was the strongest on the river, the height of the banks, combined with the narrowness and peculiar winding of the river, placing the batteries on the hillsides above the reach of guns aboard ships.

At the time of Farragut's first attack there were 26 guns in position, as follows: two 10-inch guns; one 9-inch gun; four 8-inch guns; five 42-pdrs., smoothbore; two 24-pdrs., smoothbore; seven 32-pdrs., rifled; two 24-pdrs., rifled; one 18-pdr., rifled; and two 12-pdrs., rifled.

Of these, one 9-inch gun, three 8-inch guns, and one 18 pdr. were located on the highest point of the bluffs above the town and in the bend of the river where they could bring a raking fire upon the ships both before and after they had passed the batteries. Just above these were located four 24-pdrs.

Half a mile below the town was a water battery about 50 feet above the river mounting two 32-pdr. rifled guns and four 42-pdr. guns. This battery was afterwards extended from Fort Hill on the north through the town and along the Warrenton ridge till it met the land batteries on the south. The 11 other guns were placed along the crest of the hills below the town, distributed over a mile or more, and it was difficult for the attacking ships to locate them exactly.

Since the entire distance to be run was about three miles, the river current three knots an hour, and the speed of the vessels that could be brought against the batteries was not over eight knots, it required at least three quarters of an hour for each vessel to pass the front of the batteries.

Besides the guns already mentioned, there were field batteries in the city.

The batteries were not all built at one time; on May 12, 1862, three batteries out of 10 were finished; on May 18, six were complete; and finally, at the time of their ultimate surrender, July, 1863, the river batteries comprised: eight 10-inch columbiads; one 9-inch Dahlgren; one 8-inch columbiad; one 7.4-inch Blakely gun; one 7-inch Brooke rifle; one 6.4-inch Brooke rifle; three 42-pdrs., smoothbore; two 32-pdrs., smoothbore; eight 32-pdrs., rifled; one 18-pdr., rifled; one 20-pdr., Parrott; one 10-inch mortar; one 8-inch siege howitzer.

There were also 13 pieces of light artillery surrendered.

This, of course, does not include the works around Vicksburg on the land side, which were some eight miles long, and held by the main body of Confederate troops.

Of Confederate troops in the vicinity of Vicksburg there were on November 30, 1862, some 6000; on December 24 of the same year, 12,000; at the end of January of the next year, 25,000, with 15,000 more near enough to be available, if needed, making a total of 40,000 available. These numbers, of course, incident to the campaign, varied considerably. In the final surrender 31,660 Confederate troops were included.

Port Hudson consisted of a series of batteries mounting in all some 20 siege guns, located along a bluff at an elevation of about 80 feet above the water. The parapets were of an average thickness of 20 feet, and were surrounded by a ditch of which the bottom was not less than 15 feet below the top of the parapet.
There were also land defenses, the line of works being from three to four miles in length..

On February 22, 1863, the garrison was 16,000; in March, over 20,000; but in April, only about 7000, the others having been sent away — in the main, to Vicksburg.

Grand Gulf on April 29, 1863, contained some 13 guns, eight of which were 32-pdrs. or smaller.

Fort Hindman, also known as Arkansas Post, was a permanent bastioned work of square trace, 300 feet on the side, standing on ground of such elevation as to be above the reach of floods, on the left bank of the Arkansas River at the head of Horse Shoe Bend. It had three casemates — one in the curtain facing the approach up the bend, and one each in the face of the northeast and southeast bastions, commanding the same approach.

In each bastion casemate was a 9-inch gun and in the curtain casemate an 8-inch gun. There were four smooth bore light pieces on the parade of the fort and six similar pieces in a line of rifle pits exterior to and above it. There was also a line of trenches a mile and a half below the fort; but these were untenable as soon as the fort came under fire.

The garrison at the time the work was attacked was reported by the Confederates to contain 3000 effective men, although a greater number were actually surrendered.

In addition to the works specifically mentioned, there were also works at Haynes' Bluff above Vicksburg, and minor works on some of the rivers emptying into the Mississippi.

The Federal Mississippi operations were carried on by several groups of vessels — the Mississippi Flotilla under Porter; the West Gulf Squadron under Farragut; and, in the early operations, Foote's fleet, later commanded by Davis. There were also a large class of auxiliary vessels, such as rams and river gunboats, the lighter of which were called tin-clads.

On October 1, 1862, the flotilla of river gunboats and other armed vessels which up to that time had been operated by the Army, were turned over to the Navy, and all vessels thereafter operating on the Mississippi River were called the Mississippi Squadron. In January 1863, this squadron numbered: 11 iron-clads; 38 armored gunboats; 15 tugs and dispatch boats. In all, some 70 vessels, whose aggregate tonnage was 16,905; personnel, 5500; and armament, 304 guns.

The composition of this fleet varied from time to time. For a detailed table of its composition during the Vicksburg operations, see the Century Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. 111, page 581.

Of land forces taking part in the Mississippi River campaigns there was the army under General Grant, whose main objective was Vicksburg and whose military operations overshadow the work of the fleet, and the forces under General Banks, who conducted the siege of Port Hudson.

It is, of course, not the intention to take up in detail the operations of the armies operating against the land side of the various works but to limit ourselves chiefly to the river side.

Narrative of Events
The Navy, beginning early in December 1862, made effort to clear the Yazoo, as it was intended that General McClernand should land along that river and make the first attempt upon Vicksburg from that direction. This expedition is of no particular interest, except that it is one of the few cases of the successful use of mines, or torpedoes, as they were then called.

The Cairo, a Federal vessel ran among Confederate mines with the result that there were two explosions under her bow and one under her stern, the former being so severe as to lift guns from the deck. The vessel was at once pushed into the bank and attempts were made to keep her afloat, without success, however, for she sank in 12 minutes, going down in six fathoms and becoming a total loss.

The mines were merely demijohns filled with powder and ignited by means of a common friction primer rigidly secured inside. Wires led from the primer of one mine to that of another. The mines were arranged in pairs and anchored some 20 feet apart.

On December 8 Sherman was directed to move down with troops from Memphis in order to cooperate with Porter in the reduction of Vicksburg. The expedition started December 20, arriving on the 26th on the Yazoo, on the low banks of which it landed. The force consisted of 50 regiments and 10 batteries, in all some 32,000 men and 60 guns.

The gunboats accompanying the expedition occupied the river for some eight miles.

An assault was made against the works in front of Vicksburg on the 29th, but failed. The expedition was then given up and on January 2 the troops were reembarked, the transports moving out into the Mississippi and anchoring five miles above Vicksburg.

McClernand, joining the expedition at Milliken's Bend on January 3, assumed command; and, "having nothing better to do," decided to make an attack on Fort Hindman, on the Arkansas River some 50 miles from its mouth, a fort which is better known, perhaps, under the name of Arkansas Post.

This fort commanded the approach to Little Rock, Ark., and was particularly obnoxious to the Federals at this time, by reason of being the base from which small Confederate expeditions were sent against their communications on the Mississippi, which, in a straight line, was only 15 miles away.

There were three iron-clads, De Kalb, Louisville, and Cincinnati, as well as the light-draught gunboats, sent to accompany the expedition. The troops were moved by transports, which also towed the gunboats. The total strength of the expeditionary force was some 32,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry, and 40 pieces of artillery.

On January 9, 1863, the troops were landed about four miles below the fort and moved around to its rear, while one of the light vessels moved up and cleared out the trenches.

At about 5:30 p.m., the troops having been reported ready, the three iron-clads advanced to within 400 yards of the work and opened fire. The vessels took up a position with the Louisville in the center, the De Kalb, on the right, and the Cincinnati on the left, each having one of the fort's casemate guns assigned to it as target. The vessels attacked bow on with three guns each, and the naval fire against the work was so superior that the Confederates were entirely unable to reply to it.

During the action the lighter vessels also came up and fired shell and shrapnel. One of them, the Rattler, was ordered to run by the fort and enfilade it, which was successfully done, the vessel later rejoining the fleet. No assault, however, was made by the Army.

On the next day, at 1:30 p.m., the land forces being again reported ready, the fleet renewed its attack, moving to within a few hundred yards of the fort and opening fire with some 66 pieces. The guns opposed to the fleet were silenced by 4 p.m., and several naval vessels ran by, going further up the river, so as to destroy a ferry and cut off the fort.

The artillery with the Federal land forces also engaged the fort, and, at 4:30 p.m., the troops having worked their way close up to the entrenchments, orders were issued for a general assault; but before it could be made the fort was surrendered, with some 5000 troops.

In the action, every gun opposing the fleet was either destroyed or dismounted and the casemates were knocked to pieces.

The De Kalb had one 32-pdr. dismounted and one 10-inch gun destroyed, and was severely damaged in the hull. The other vessels were repeatedly struck but not rendered unfit for service, due, perhaps, to their armor protection. All damages sustained were caused by shots entering the ports. The Navy's casualties were six killed and 25 wounded.

On the 16th, when McClernand's forces were still further up the river continuing the destruction of minor Confederate works, General Grant directed their return to the lines before Vicksburg. On January 24 the Federal vessels lay off the mouth of the Yazoo River and extended from there to the neck of land opposite Vicksburg, where General Grant's forces were disembarking.

The Confederates, at this time, had full control of the river between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, as well as the communications along the Red River.

Porter now determined to send some of his vessels down the river, notwithstanding the fact that the batteries of Vicksburg had been much strengthened since Farragut passed them the preceding year, for the importance of the work justified the risk. Accordingly, he designated a ram, the Queen of the West, to run the batteries, which on February 2 she did, though in running by she was struck some 12 times by shot and had one of her guns dismounted. No men, however, were hurt.

On the 12th Porter sent down the river the Indianola, which, when fired upon by the batteries, went on at full speed, and, though remaining under fire for 20 minutes longer, was not struck.

A third vessel, a small Confederate transport, having been captured, the three vessels moved up and down the river waters, including those of the Red River, harassing the Confederates for some three weeks, but were subsequently destroyed in action with the Confederates, or otherwise.

When the news of these happenings reached Farragut, he determined on coming up the river again.
On March 12 he was at Baton Rouge where his fleet was assembled. On the morning of the 14th he anchored with his fleet off Profit's Island, seven miles below the bend on which Port Hudson is situated. Here he conferred with Commander Caldwell of the Essex, who had for some time occupied the point with half a dozen mortar schooners.

From this point up the river, the course lies nearly due north; then it takes a sharp turn to the west-southwest for a distance of one or two miles. Port Hudson is situated on the east bank just below that bend. The bluffs, from 80 to 100 feet high, on which the batteries were placed, begin at the bend and extend for a mile and a half down the river.

At this time there were mounted at Port Hudson 19 heavy guns, as follows: two 10-inch columbiads; two 8-inch columbiads; two 42-pdrs.; two 32-pdrs.; three 24-pdrs., smoothbore; eight 80-50-pdrs., rifled.

Admiral Farragut contemplated passing these batteries. He had with him: Hartford 24 guns; Monongahela 10 guns; Mississippi 17 guns; Richmond 24 guns; Genesee 8 guns; Albatross 6 guns; and Kineo 6 guns.

For making the run-by, the larger ships, except the Mississippi, were directed to take a gunboat on the port side secured well aft, so to keep the port battery clear; and each vessel was to keep a little to the starboard of the one next ahead, so as to be able to use the bow guns. Shortly before 10 p.m. the vessels weighed anchor and advanced in the following order: Hartford, Richmond, Monongahela, and Mississippi.

About 11 o'clock, as they drew near the batteries, the Hartford, in fact, having already passed the first battery, the Confederates fired rockets and opened with their guns. Along the river bank locomotive headlights had been placed and large fires built to light up the river in order that the vessels might be seen; but the firing of the fleet and of the guns on shore soon created such smoke that these preparations were rendered useless.

The smoke, settling down upon the water in a still atmosphere, soon hid everything; so that not only could the vessels not be seen from land, but also the pilots of the vessels could not see.

The Hartford, in the lead, pushed on and got clear of the batteries, losing one killed and two wounded, but sustaining no serious damage to the vessel.

The Richmond, with a gunboat alongside, coming next, had its safety valve struck by a shot, which released the steam, and deprived the vessel of its motive power. Unable longer to breast the current, the Richmond drifted down the river and, after some narrow escapes from the fire of the fleet, was carried out of range by its gunboat.

The Monongahela, with a gunboat, came next; but after a series of mishaps neither vessel got by the batteries, as both had their engines disabled and their rudders carried away. The Monongahela had six killed and 21 wounded. The gunboat had no casualties.

The Mississippi, in the meantime, had passed the Monongahela, but ran aground and could not be gotten off. So, under fire from three of the shore batteries, she was abandoned in flames, and subsequently drifted down the river and blew up. Some 64 of her crew were missing, of whom probably 25 had been killed.

That the run-by ended rather disastrously, is due, perhaps, not so much to the Confederate fire as to circumstances: it was dark, the channel was intricate, the current was rapid (about five knots), and the speed of the ships was low.

The Hartford and the gunboat with her were now in rather a dangerous position; though it may be said the object of the expedition had been attained, for the Red River was blockaded and was not again open to the Confederates, notwithstanding they still held Port Hudson.

The two vessels went up the river, and on the 20th arrived below Vicksburg and got in touch with Porter, after having on the way engaged a battery of four pieces at Grand Gulf, where they lost two men and six wounded.

Porter, meanwhile, had been engaged in various small expeditions, cooperating with the Army in its movements around Vicksburg, for which purpose he had navigated various streams emptying into the Mississippi. These operations are generally known as the Bayou Expeditions. They entailed much work and finally failed.

On the evening of March 31 Farragut with the Hartford, a gunboat, and one of the rams, went down the river. The batteries at Grand Gulf were passed again with small loss, and on April 1 Farragut reached the Red River. On the 6th he was near Port Hudson and very anxious as to the news of the rest of the fleet; so his secretary, Mr. Gabandau, volunteered to pass Port Hudson in a skiff at night and did it successfully, reaching the vessels below at 10 o'clock that night.

General Grant, in the meantime, was busy with the problem of Vicksburg and was moving his troops along the west bank of the river, with a view to reaching New Carthage by means of a detour of 35 miles, although the straight line distance is but 20 miles. As soon as this movement was decided upon, Porter made arrangements for running the batteries of Vicksburg with the greater part of his fleet.

Coal barges were to be towed on the starboard side of each vessel, so as to have an available fuel supply; and, as there was no intention of engaging the Confederates, every precaution was to be taken to avoid being heard or seen.

At a quarter past nine on the night of April 16 the fleet got under way. It consisted of the Benton, Lafayette, Louisville, Mound City, Pittsburg, Carondelet, and Tuscumbia, and had an armament consisting altogether of 79 guns. Some army transports, carrying stores only, accompanied the fleet.

The river batteries at this time contained 31 pieces of heavy artillery and 13 of light.

The fleet moved down at a speed scarcely exceeding the drift of the current. At 11:16 p.m.. the guns of the batteries opened up and the engagement soon became general. It was another running fight, for the vessels kept on moving.

The armed vessels received no injury unfitting them for service, and by 3 a.m. were all anchored 12 miles above New Carthage, again ready to cooperate with the Army. Ten or 12 men had been slightly wounded, a few coal barges had been sunk, and one transport had been abandoned by her crew. And, while other transports had been more or less severely damaged, yet the movement was considered such a comparative success that Grant directed six more transports to run the batteries. It was done on the night of the 22nd, but in the movement one was sunk.

As the number of the transports was limited, it was decided to move the troops by land to Hard Times Landing, 25 miles below New Carthage. The fleet, with the transports, followed down the river.

Five miles below Hard Times on the opposite shore is Grand Gulf, where was located a battery that had engaged the Federal vessels repeatedly in the course of Farragut's movements up and down the river. But, the Confederates having strengthened this battery after the fight at Port Hudson, Farragut did not care to engage it unaided and remained off the Red River on the Mississippi, keeping it blockaded, while arrangements were made for a joint attack by land and naval forces.

Above Grand Gulf is the mouth of the Big Black River, by which supplies from the Red River country were transported to the interior of the Confederate lines, the river being navigable for some sixty miles. Eight hundred yards below the mouth of the Big Black River is the Point of Rocks, rising about 75 feet above the river. Here was the upper battery, consisting of two 8-inch rifles, one 8-inch smooth bore, and a 30-pdr. rifle on a wheel mount. A line of rifle pits and a covered way led from this point to the lower fort, three quarters of a mile farther down, in which were mounted:

One 100-pdr. rifle, one 8-inch smooth bore, and two 32-pdrs. There were also five light rifled guns and ten 20-pdrs. in various parts of the works. The Point of Rocks battery was close to the river. All the works were ordinary earth works.

The plan was for the fleet to silence the works, and then for the troops to cross on transports under cover of the gunboats and take the place by assault.

On the 29th at 7 a.m. the fleet got under way, the Pittsburg leading, and the Louisville, Carondelet, and Mound City  following, all firing upon the upper battery as long as their guns bore, and then passing on to the attack of the lower work, which was the real task assigned them; while the remaining vessels, the Lafayette, Tuscumbia, and Benton, following the first four, took up the engagement with the upper work.

The Benton was struck about 11 a.m. and rendered unmanageable. Her place was taken by the Pittsburg of the first division, which had just moved up, the lower fort having been silenced. The entire squadron now concentrated their fire upon the upper work, the Point of Rocks battery, all keeping under way and firing at varying ranges. About noon the Tuscumbia's engine became disabled and she was compelled to drop down below Grand Gulf. The action was kept up with vigor till 1 p.m., when the fire from the upper fort also slackened considerably.

But notwithstanding the slackened fire, General Grant as well as Admiral Porter now realized that the works were too high and too strong to be taken from the water side; so it was decided to land troops from the transports, and to march down to the point immediately below Grand Gulf. Accordingly, the vessels were directed to withdraw to Hard Times.

The guns of the shore batteries had been so well protected by their elevation above the river that none had been seriously damaged during an engagement of some five hours. Nor had the fleet, through roughly handled in some instances, been very materially damaged. The Benton had seven killed and 19 wounded: the Tuscumbia five killed and 24 wounded; the Pittsburg six killed and 13 wounded; the Lafayette none killed and only one wounded; while the others had 110 casualties.

That evening the fleet with the transports, got under way at 8 p.m., and, with the loss of only one man, ran by the batteries and anchored at a point four miles below Grand Gulf.

On April 30, for the purpose of preventing the Confederates at Vicksburg from sending down reinforcements to Grand Gulf to oppose the landing of the Federals there, a feigned attack in conjunction with the 15th Army Corps was made at Haynes' Bluff by the vessels of Porter's fleet that had remained above Vicksburg. The fleet was in action from 11 am. to 2 p.m. on the 30th, and the feint was continued the following day, at 8 in the evening of which the troops participating were withdrawn and prepared to join the main body of the Army, the vessels engaged returning to their anchorage off the mouth of the Yazoo. In the attack the vessels suffered severely, one, the Choctaw being struck as many as 46 times; but, in spite of that, casualties among the personnel were not numerous.

The work at Haynes' Bluff was subsequently abandoned on the 17th of May due to the advance of Grant's troops, and at that time had in it 14 heavy guns, including 8-inch and 10-inch smooth bore guns and 7-1/2 inch rifles.

On the 3rd of May Porter came up the river, intending again to attack the works of Grand Gulf, but found they had been evacuated, the march of the Federal forces inland having rendered them untenable. Investigation showed that, while the earth works had been torn to pieces by the fire of the fleet, yet with the exception of two 32-pdrs. in the lower battery which had been dismounted and broken, the guns were still in position. A large quantity of ammunition also was found.

The same day General Grant arrived and Grand Gulf was now made his base of supply instead of Bruinsburg.

Farragut, during this time, was still blockading the Red River, operating between it and Port Hudson, capturing small Confederate vessels and destroying stores that fell into his hands. Also an expedition had been sent up the Red River, the Black River, and various small streams; and on the 4th of May an engagement was fought on the first mentioned river between three of the smaller vessels and a work called Fort De Russey. The action lasted 40 minutes, when the vessels withdrew, the force being too small for a successful attack.

When, however, on the 5th Fort De Russey was attacked by four vessels of Porter's fleet which had arrived the evening before, and two gunboats, the fort was found abandoned and all guns removed, except one 64-pdr. So the vessels contented themselves with destroying the works, and then continued up the river.

On the 8th Porter returned, although some of the smaller vessels were left on patrol duty along the various streams.

Farragut now felt he could leave Porter in entire charge, so himself returned to New Orleans by one of the bayous, leaving four of his vessels on blockade duty above Port Hudson.

On the 23rd of May Port Hudson was duly invested, General Banks' forces that had been operating in Louisiana reaching the Mississippi some five or six miles above Port Hudson, and General Augur, with another body of Federal troops, coming up from Baton Rouge and joining them there. An unsuccessful assault being made on the 27th, the troops settled down to a regular siege.

The vessels of the fleet, including some mortar schooners, now engaged the river batteries of Port Hudson, which at the time consisted of four 8-inch and 10-inch columbiads and two heavy rifles. The exchange of fire was long continued, and it is estimated that the Confederates between May 23 and June 26 fired at the fleet from these guns some 1000 shell.

On the 18th of May, Porter received word from Grant concerning the operations in front of Vicksburg, so he moved up the gunboats below Vicksburg to fire on the hill batteries. On the 19th, six mortar boats were also moved up with orders to fire day and night as rapidly as possible.

On the 21st Porter's vessels engaged the Vicksburg batteries for some two hours in anticipation of an assault by the Army. But, as the assault was not successful, regular siege operations were begun, and Vicksburg, as well as Port Hudson, was formally invested May 27th.

In addition to keeping up a bombardment from the vessels, the fleet during the siege of Vicksburg landed some 13 heavy guns and organized them into siege batteries manned by sailors and naval officers. But the Navy's principal task was to keep open river communication, and Porter sent various naval expeditions up the different streams, none of which, however, need be mentioned here.

On July 4, 1863, Vicksburg surrendered, and on July 9, Port Hudson, thus opening the Mississippi River from Cairo to the Gulf and ending the work of the Western Armies as well as the Mississippi squadron.

It is interesting to note that in the attack on Grand Gulf, which lasted from 8 a.m. to 1 p.m., April 29, 1863, while the Federal fleet fired some 2500 projectiles, the Confederate loss was three killed and 15 wounded. The works, however, were pretty well ploughed up. The Federal loss on this occasion was 19 killed and 56 wounded, the vessels receiving several hundred hits. The fleet had in action 81 guns against 13 on shore.

In one of the early actions against Vicksburg, on July 28, 1862, in which 35 vessels were engaged for an hour and a half, not a single Confederate gun was either disabled or silenced. And it was estimated that up to that time the fleet had fired between 20,000 and 25,000 projectiles, with resulting casualties in the batteries of seven killed and 15 wounded and two guns temporarily disabled. The necessity for an attack from the land side was believed to be conclusively proved.

In all these actions on the Mississippi, Haynes' Bluff, Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, and Port Hudson, is illustrated the value of height of site. At Vicksburg the batteries were generally over 200 feet high, and to that fact they probably owed their great immunity from serious damage by the fleet.

The practicability of a run-by in the absence of obstructions, is again demonstrated.

We have also in these operations examples of the successful use of mines.

A purely naval attack with experienced troops on shore gives but little chance of destroying guns ashore: in almost every case a combined military and naval action is required, either deliberately carried out or, at least, threatened.

The vulnerability of fortifications for defense against naval attack, when attacked in rear, is once more shown.

The operations on the Mississippi River early showed the disadvantages of the Army's having a flotilla of its own, and good policy demanded that it be combined with the Navy, thus securing the unity of command so essential in all military operations.

There is to be noted also the futility of leaving each arm, the Army and Navy, operating alone; for Vicksburg could have been taken in the early part of 1862, had troops been ready and on hand to cooperate with the Navy. As it was, the Navy had to give up its control of the river and do its work all over again.

Many of the fleet actions can be considered nothing more than artillery duels: and, like many artillery duels in land warfare, they were absolutely indecisive. It requires, generally, more than artillery fire to dislodge a force from its position: for decisive results an assault in some form is needed.