This report of the late 1861 expedition against Port Royal in South Carolina and capture of Forts Walker and Beauregard was published as part of the series on Civil War coast defense in the Journal of the United States Artillery, Vol. 38, No. 2, September-October 1912.
It was considered necessary in blockading the Atlantic coast from Hatteras to Florida to occupy as many southern ports as possible—furthermore, by holding the blockade within a harbor, it could be maintained by fewer ships and with much less fatigue than when holding an exterior blockade.
By holding Port Royal, the Navy acquired a fine base, and made it possible to maintain an effective blockade within the entrances of the whole coast from Charleston to Cape Florida, except at Fernandina.
Fort Walker was located on the upper end of Hilton Head Island, being on the left of the channel entering into Port Royal Sound. It was a closed earthwork having 21 guns mounted on the ramparts, of which 13 constituted the Channel Battery, their arrangement and classes being as follows:
In the center, one 10-inch columbiad on the right flank, five 32-pdrs., and one 9-inch Dahlgren gun.
On the left flank six guns in the following order: one 32-pdr., one 8-inch columbiad, three 42-pdrs. and one 24-pdr., rifled. In all, 13 guns on the sea front.
Besides, there were guns as follows: North bastion: one 32-pdr.; South bastion: one 32-pdr.; one 8-inch howitzer; one long 12-pdr.; South flank of bastion: one 32-pdr. (navy); Demi-lune: two 24-pdrs.; Redan: one 8-inch howitzer (navy). In all, eight guns on the land front.
The fort further had one 8-inch howitzer, not mounted; two carronades, buried in the sand; one 12-pdr., mounted in front of the work, which made a total of 25 guns.
Of the eight guns on the land front, one on the north bastion and two on the south flank could occasionally be used against ships, but the others could not.
To man the guns within the fort, and to serve as an infantry reserve outside, there were, until reinforcements arrived on the afternoon of the 6th of November, the following: Two companies Col. Wagener's 1st Artillery, South Carolina Militia, being 152 men; three companies Heyward's South Carolina Volunteers, being 210 men; four companies Dunovant's South Carolina Volunteers, being 260 men, or total: 622 men.
There were besides, when reinforcements arrived, 65 cavalrymen and 450 infantrymen, and a two-gun 12-pdr. battery of field artillery, from Georgia. While there were near enough to serve as additional reinforcements, some 650 men of the 15th South Carolina Volunteers, of whom, in fact, 220 were inside the works at Fort Walker.
The guns mentioned, owing to the limited space available, had to be put so close together that no traverses could be constructed to save the batteries from enfilade fire. The salient of the bastions of the fort on the land side, as also the demi-lune had been arranged for circular traverses, but were not so used.
In one case a long navy carriage was made use of, an embrasure being cut through the salient of the south bastion; and on these carriages two 8-inch navy howitzers were mounted. An 8-inch howitzer which was on hand for the salient of the north bastion, was not mounted, no carriage being available.
One 32-pdr. (navy) was mounted in the exterior angle of each bastion, and one long English 12-pdr., in embrasure, was placed in the shoulders to enfilade the curtain face of the work. But one of these was afterwards removed for beach defense, as was also an 8-inch howitzer. The two 24-pdrs. in barbette were mounted in the demi-lune.
For beach defense were designated two heavy shell guns, which were to occupy the two exterior flanking works commanding the beach and the approaches on both sides. They were to give a cross fire on the front of the glacis, or to cover the water front of the works; but there were finally used only two carronades, without carriages, simply buried in the sand, and pointing in the designated direction, affording fire in case the works were stormed.
Also the 12-pdr. on the north bastion was put in in such manner as to sweep the beach along any approach from the south, while the ditches on the water front not protected by bastions had caponieres constructed of palmetto logs, pierced for two tiers of musketry and approached by galleries leading under the parapets from the interior of the fort. Thus, in case crossing the ditch were attempted by any one, he would come under a cross fire of ball and canister.
As a protection to the land batteries of the fort a heavy longitudinal traverse was built; and to insure against casualties from shot and shell bursting on the parade, small traverses in rear of each gun of the water battery were built, sufficiently low, however, to offer no obstacle to the passage of such shell as might graze the parapet of the water front.
It was further intended to construct a splinter proof over the entire space between the principal traverse and the curtain of the work, but material was not furnished in sufficient quantity. With the material obtained, only one-third of the intended space could be covered.
The magazine of the work was large and complete and so well protected that, although an enormous amount of shot and shell was fired against it, it sustained no damages.
Temporary hot-shot furnaces were erected.
Constructing a line of infantry works about two miles to the south, and erecting a battery where Skull Creek enters Broad River was contemplated, but neither was accomplished.
Fort Beauregard was situated on Bay Point, Philips Island, across the channel from Fort Walker, the distance between the forts being 2-5/8 miles.
Fort Beauregard was an earthwork of four faces, all fronting on the water, and the guns were so mounted on each face as to command the approaches to Broad and Beaufort rivers.
Its main work mounted five 32-pdrs., one 6-inch rifle, five 42-pdrs., one 8-inch columbiad, one 10-inch columbiad, or in all 13 guns.
There were inside the fort also two 6-pdr. field pieces (old Spanish guns). About 150 yards on either flank were two small outworks, connected with the main work by trenches, in one of which were mounted two 24-pdrs. (sand battery), and in the other three 32-pdrs. (hot-shot battery).
The garrison consisted of three companies of the 9th South Carolina Volunteers; six companies of the 12th South Carolina Volunteers, and other small detachments, the entire force on Bay Point Island being 619 officers and men. But of these only two companies, consisting of 149 men, manned the fort proper, 83 men Co. H, 9th (11th) South Carolina Volunteers, holding the main work (13 guns), and 66 men, Co. D, 9th (11th) South Carolina Volunteers, holding the outside batteries, (5 guns, sand and hot-shot batteries).
The Confederate naval forces consisted of three small side-wheel steamers, each of which carried two 32-pdrs.
The Union fleet making the attack comprised the following: Wabash (flagship) frigate: two 10-inch guns, 28 9-inch guns, 14 8-inch guns, two 12-pdrs.; Susquehanna (side-wheel steamer): 15 8-inch guns, one 24-pdr., two 12 pdrs.; Mohican: two 11-inch guns, four 32-pdrs., one 12-pdr.; Seminole, one 11-inch gun, four 32-pdrs.; Pocahontas, one 10-inch gun, four 32-pdrs.; Pawnee, eight 9-inch guns, two 12-pdrs.
Four gun boats, Seneca, Ottawa, Pembina, Unadilla, each having one 11-inch gun, one 20-pdr., two 24-pdrs. Vandalia, four 8-inch guns, 16 32-pdrs., one 12-pdr.; Bienville, eight 32-pdrs., one 30-pdr.; Augusta, eight 32-pdrs., one 12-pdr.; Airlew, six 32-pdrs., one 20-pdr. rifle; Penguin, four 32-pdrs., one 12-pdr.; R.B. Forbes, two 32-pdrs.; Isaac Smith, eight 8-inch guns, one 30-pdr., (broadside battery, thrown overboard on way from Hampton Roads).
Union land forces comprised: three brigades consisting of 14 regiments of infantry, one regiment of engineers, and battery E, 3rd Artillery; in all 574 officers and 12,079 men.
On Aug. 3, 1861, an order was issued by the Navy Department, directing Admiral Dupont to cooperate with an army commander (not named) in an expedition against some point in the South.
On Sept. 18 the president, in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, directed that this expedition be hastened and made ready to sail Oct. 1, and that Gen. T.W. Sherman be placed in command of the land forces.
On Oct. 12, an order was issued to Admiral Dupont to cooperate with the army against some point to be chosen by him on the southern coast suitable for a naval base. The naval force was determined on and was ordered to rendezvous at Hampton Roads. It was to consist of about 75 vessels, including the vessels of war, transports, colliers etc.
On Oct. 28 25 vessels (colliers) under convoy of the Vandalia, set sail for Savannah to deceive the Confederates as to the real object of the expedition.
The military force in the meantime embarked at Annapolis, where it had previously been assembled, leaving there Oct. 21, and arriving at Hampton Roads the next day. On Oct. 29 a fleet of some 50 vessels, including naval convoy and transports etc., left Hampton Roads and set sail for Port Royal, the finest harbor south of Hatteras, that point having been selected by Admiral Dupont and General Sherman.
Every ship that left on this expedition went out with sealed orders, to be opened only in case of separation. The sealed orders directed an assembly off Port Royal.
It was expected that Port Royal would be reached in five days; but in consequence of fierce storms and adverse winds Port Royal Bay was not reached by any of the ships till the 4th of November. During the storms the fleet had been scattered and two boats lost; but by good fortune the number of men lost was only seven.
A reconnaissance was made, and time was taken to buoy the channel. The reconnaissance developed the fact that the Confederates had field works strongly garrisoned, and three small gun boats. It developed also that Fort Walker and Fort Beauregard mounted about 20 guns each; that Fort Walker was the stronger; that the greater part of the guns were on the two sea fronts; and that the northern sea front was the weaker.
It was thought proper to reduce the works (Fort Walker) on Hilton Head first; but to do this, fire would probably have to be met from the batteries at Bay Point (Fort Beauregard) also.
The original plan contemplated cooperation of land forces with the navy in making the attack, but this had to be set aside due to the loss of the greater part of the means of disembarkation in the storm. Furthermore the only points where troops could land were five to six miles (measured around an intervening shoal) from the anchoring place of the transports, altogether too far considering the inadequate means of landing. Accordingly, it was decided to reduce the works by naval attack alone.
Gunboats engaged in reconnaissance were attacked by Confederate gunboats on several days; and on the 5th of November the Federal gunboats attacked the batteries for some 45 minutes, to determine their armament. However, no damage was done the forts except that three men in Fort Beauregard were slightly burned by the explosion of a caisson that was struck by a shell.
Meanwhile, on the 4th, 5th and 6th of November, the scattered fleet was coming in; and on the 6th, there being some 45 vessels assembled, the attack could have been made, but it was postponed on account of boisterous weather.
The next day, however, the 7th of November, was fair, the wind had died down and the water was unusually smooth. So at 8:30 a.m. the fleet of war vessels headed by the Wabash, bore towards the northwest till reaching the main channel, then moved directly against the Confederate batteries.
At 9:25 a.m. a 9-inch Dahlgren gun at Fort Beauregard opened up on the Wabash, it being then within range. This first shell exploded near the muzzle of the gun and was harmless. That fire was seconded by Fort Walker and replied to by the ships, the action soon becoming general.
The attack comprised two squadrons—a main squadron advancing in line ahead and a flanking squadron to be thrown off to the northern section of the harbor to engage the Confederate gunboats.
The main squadron, which went in on the left, advanced in the following order: 1. Wabash, 46 guns; 2. Susquehanna, 15 guns; 3. Mohican, six guns; 4. Seminole, five guns; 6. Unadilla, four guns; 7. Ottawa, four guns; 8. Pembina, four guns; 9. Vandalia, 20 guns; towed by tug Smith, nine guns.
The flanking squadron: 1. Bienville, nine guns; 2. Seneca, four guns; 3. Curlew, seven guns; 4. Penguin, five guns; 5. Augusta, nine guns.
At noon the following joined the flanking squadron: Mercury, —; Forbes, two guns; Pocahontas, five guns.
The plan of attack was to pass midway between Forts Walker and Beauregard, receiving and returning the fire, to a point 2-1/2 miles north of the latter, at which point the flanking squadron was to attack the Confederate gunboats and the main squadron was to round to south by west, closing with Fort Walker, encountering it on its weakest flank, and at the same time enfilading in a direct line its two water fronts.
While heading southward the vessels were to be head to the tide, which left them under command with low speed. When opposite the forts, the engines were to slow down just enough to keep the order of battle, and to pass the fort in slow succession. On reaching the extremity of Hilton Head the vessels were to turn north and east, again engaging Fort Walker.
In spite of the fire from the batteries, the fleet soon passed both batteries apparently unharmed, and then returning delivered a terrific fire of shot and shell in the flank and front of the work.
In addition to this moving battery—the fleet—the work was also enfiladed by two gunboats anchored to the north of Fish Hall Creek, and another near the edge of the shoals to the south.
At 10 a.m. the fleet turned southward and signaled the Vandalia to close up. At 10:15 a.m. the line passed Fort Walker at 800 yards range, the fleet following the flagship; then it stood to the north and again rounded south, passing Fort Walker at 600 yards.
At 11:30 a.m. the flag of Fort Walker was shot away and the fire of the fort greatly reduced, and as the squadron stood north for the third time, the fire of the forts ceased entirely.
On Fort Walker, during the bombardment, the enfilading fire of the gunboats inflicted considerable damage. The fort had no gun on either flank of the bastion to reply with, for the 32-pdr. on the right flank was shattered very early by a round shot, while on the north flank the gun was not mounted for the lack of a carriage.
Furthermore, after the fourth shot the 10-inch columbiad bounded over the limber and became useless; one 24-pdr. cannon was choked with a shell and was idle during nearly the entire engagement; the shells for the two rifled guns did not fit; and two 42-pdrs. became useless. The 42-pdr and 32-pdr. remaining were served till the ammunition failed.
From the beginning of the action the fire of the ships had been endured and replied to. So at 10;30 a.m. the gunners became so fatigued that a greater part of Captain Read's battery, located about 1-3/4 miles in rear of the fort, were brought in to take the places of the men in the fort.
The attack of the fleet continued unabated, but still no decided damage to any of the ships was noticeable.
At 2 p.m. men were abandoning Fort Walker, having defended it 4-1/2 hours and retiring only when all but three guns on the water front had been disabled and only 500 lbs. of powder remained in the magazine. There had been some 255 men in the fort during the action, at first 220, then later 255.
The fire of the fleet slackened on Fort Beauregard and was concentrated on Hilton Head (Fort Walker). At 2:45 p.m. Fort Walker was in possession of marines and sailors from the fleet, and the American flag raised over the work, and by nightfall a brigade of troops (Wright's) were also landed and in possession.
The retreat of the Confederates from Fort Walker was made in good order, and was made towards Ferry Point, about six miles distant. Fearing that the retreat might be cut off by Federal gunboats at Skull Creek, the island was abandoned and the force concentrated on the mainland.
The attack on Fort Beauregard, though severe, was not so concentrated and heavy as on Fort Walker. In this case the fleet passed northward and hammered the fort at long range. Of the guns of the fort only the following were available, i.e. capable of being used against the fleet: one 8-inch Rodman, bored for 24-pdrs, rifled; two 42-pdrs; one 10-inch columbiad; two 42-pdrs, reamed to 8 inches; one 32-pdr, in hot-shot battery.
On Bay Point, as stated, were some 600 men, of whom 149 were in the works; the troops outside the works were entrusted with the protection of the eastern part of the island and with the defense of the bastion line at Island Narrows, where an attack was expected from the enemy.
An attempt was made to send an additional company from Fort Walker by steamer, but the company had to return, finding itself in danger of being cut off by the fleet.
During the progress of the action it was observed from Fort Beauregard that Fort Walker was silent and that a boat from the fleet was approaching it. So arrangements were then made to retreat from Fort Beauregard towards the Narrows, all property being abandoned on account of lack of roads on the island. The force finally retreated to Beaufort, getting there on Friday, Nov. 9.
The commanding officer, Col. R.G.M. Dunovant, states in his report that his reasons for retreating were that he had received no instructions as to the mode in which the island should be defended, nor the contingencies upon which it should be abandoned; and that there were no arrangements, by means of signals or otherwise, for receiving orders from headquarters.
Having been totally without information of any plan devised, or facilities provided, for retreat in case of disaster, he had felt that circumstances imposed the obligation of endeavoring to secure some means of carrying out the evacuation of the island, should it become necessary, so he had gathered various boats etc, and made the necessary plans and arrangements.
From the nature of the attack the forces at Fort Beauregard were the only active participants. The last gun was fired from the fort at 3:35 p.m., but was not replied to by the fleet. As Fort Walker had been abandoned and as the remaining fort could no longer protect the harbor, orders were given for the withdrawal of the garrison before its retreat might be cut off, the greater part of the powder was destroyed, guns spiked, and about 4:45 p.m. march was taken up for Eddings Island.
One of the columbiads was fired 57 times, others not quite so often. Fire was directed exclusively at the larger vessels, and hot-shot was fired from the two 42-pdrs. on the front face.
The fuzes of the 8-inch shell being defective—igniting too soon—rifle shell had to be refitted to the gun after one or two rounds. The gun itself exploded on firing the 32nd round, slightly wounding all the men in the detachment. The explosion was presumed to be due to the gun having been loaded while hot, and then allowed to cool, the strains set up by the contraction resulting in explosion when the piece was fired.
The hot-shot battery fired only a few rounds, but was so exposed during the cannonade that it could not be served.
Recurring to Fort Walker, Colonel Wagener, of the 1st Artillery (Confederate), states in his report that the works of the fort were manned in one and one-half minutes after beating the long roll; that during the fight there was just sufficient motion in the air to blow the smoke of the ships' guns in the faces of the land gunners, preventing sight except by glimpses; that sailing vessels were towed by steamers, making their maneuvers extremely accurate; that ships were constantly changing their range; that the land forces were much hampered by not having a battery on the bluff which commanded the flank; and that the ships took position in the mouth of the creek, giving the forts a raking fire, dismounting guns, wounding men and doing great damage.
For some minutes after 9 a.m. the fire of the forts was very slow, and the range to the ships too great. Shortly after 9 a.m. the ships reached a position in front of the batteries at about 1-1/4 miles, delivering a slow and well directed fire and showing that they were going past the forts.
Rapid fire and hot-shot from the forts made little impression on the ships, due to the long range and to the ships' being in constant motion. So in a few minutes several ships got by, and three took a position enfilading the batteries from the northwest flank, while others, which were not yet in action, took up a course opposite the south east front.
The Wabash, the largest ship, returned down the front delivering an accurate fire at short range, supported at longer range by two other ships. When these maneuvers had been executed and positions established, Major Hagar says: "The fort was simply fought as a point of honor, for from that moment we were defeated, excepting perhaps by providential interference."
At 11 a.m. it was reported that the Bay Point batteries had been silenced. At 1 p.m. it was reported that nearly all the ammunition was expended—there being only 10 or 11 rounds for the 32-pdrs. left—and it was thereupon determined by the Confederate commander to evacuate the work; so under cover of the fire of some of the guns the troops were withdrawn, and about 2 p.m. the last detachment was ordered from the guns.
Of the channel battery, only three guns were in condition to continue the fight, which was hopeless.
The defense of Fort Walker involved two propositions-one, to repel an attack from the fleet, and the other, an assault by the beach from the troops in the transports.
As an offensive work Fort Walker found itself unequal to the immense force brought against it. As a defensive work it accomplished its purpose by so well protecting the lines of the garrison that, after sustaining an incessant fire of shot and shell for nearly five hours, only 10 of the garrison were killed. This number would probably have been less, had the traverses on the water front been practicable.
At the close of the engagement the fort had sustained but little damage, although hundreds of shot and shell were buried in the traverses and parapets.
Thus it will be seen that this entire action was carried out by the navy, the troops accompanying the fleet being but spectators After the reduction of the works they were taken possession of by the army, which found the works on Hilton Head severely crippled, guns dismounted etc.
At sunset the fleet found Fort Beauregard abandoned, and raised the flag over it the next day.
There were captured some 52 pieces of ordnance, ammunition etc.
Casualties: Fleet: Killed 8; severely wounded 7; slightly wounded 17; total 31.
Fort Walker: killed 10; wounded 20.
Fort Beauregard: wounded 13.
15th South Carolina: killed 1, wounded 15, captured 3 (sick in hospital), missing 4.
or in all: Confederate loss killed 11, wounded 48, captured 3, missing 4, total 66.
The Wabash is struck nine times in the hull and the spars, and many more times, at least 20, through the rigging. Curlew: one shot strikes Parrott 20-pdr., breaks off 18 inches of muzzle, disables gun. Ship fires 102 shot, 33 shell.
Pembina: not hit. Augusta: one hit; picks up disabled Penguin and tows her throughout the engagement. Vandalia: No data. Penguin: Boiler struck by shot from Fort Beauregard; then shot from Fort Walker carries away tiller chain; ship towed by Augusta.
Ottawa: Struck by 32-pdr. from Fort Beauregard; then takes up position enfilading Fort Walker, disperses infantry with shrapnel; 500 yards range. Forbes: Not hit; expends 43 shell.
Isaac Smith: Not hit; fires 28 shells at works, three shells at Confederate gun boats. Unadilla: Hit six times; expends 33 11-inch shell, 37 20-pdr. shell. Seneca: Not hit; expends 63 11-inch shell, 33 Parrott shell, 12 24-pdr. shrapnel. Pawnee: seven hits from Fort Beauregard.
Seminole: six hits; expends 43 11-inch shell, 82 32-pdr. shell, 60 round shot. Susquehanna: 10 hits in hull, 20 hits aloft; expends two shot, 424 shell. Mohican: five hits in hull, many times aloft. Bienville: Hit more than three times; expends 84 32-pdr. shot, 39 32-pdr. shell, 62 rifle shell. Pocahontas: Expends 24 10-inch shell, 37 32-pdr. shell, five 32-pdr. shot, four 15-pdr. shell.
Drayton, commanding the Pocahontas, says in an unofficial letter that forts fired wildly, all shot over, and ships did likewise. Forts not damaged in least, only three guns knocked over, Pocahontas not hit except aloft. Many shot found as much as 1-1/2 miles inland.
Speed of vessels six miles.
In summary:
Earthworks of forts were of faulty construction; all guns being mounted in barbette, which, on low sites, affords no protection to gun or to personnel.
Entire sea battery of Fort Walker could be enfiladed by a position north of it, as was actually done. There were no traverses between guns. Of the number of guns on hand, too many were mounted on the land front. No mortars in the armament.
No effort made to close the channel by obstructions, mines etc. Precipitous abandonment of works. No cooperation, apparently, between forts. No system of inter-communication. Lack of definite orders, or total absence of orders.
Disappearance of Confederate commander during the engagement, and then "lost in the woods" (see official report, Rebellion Records).
Poor shooting on both sides, fleet fired presumably over 2000 rounds at ranges of 500 to 1000 yards. Usual lack of ammunition assigned as the reason for quitting Fort Walker. Guns plainly visible, and only four dismounted by fire of fleet. Preponderance of fire of the fleet over that of the forts should have kept gunners on fleet reasonably cool.
Poor fuzes complained of at Fort Beauregard. Infantry used as artillery at Fort Beauregard. Shells found not to fit guns in action. The forts' shooting seemed to be better than the ships' and yet fired under tremendous odds, due to ships' great preponderance in weight of metal thrown.
Insufficient personnel manning guns at Fort Walker, necessitating additional troops being brought in during the action. Use of infantry fire by troops north of Fort Walker against ships. An example of a pure naval action, showing abandonment of works due to fire effect alone.