The Birth Of Modern Artillery In The 1846-48 War Against Mexico
By Jameson Riley Johnson
Winter1998 - Vol 20, No. 1



Imagine if the Mexican border was in Colorado. What if Hollywood was not an American city? What if the Dallas Cowboys were a Mexican soccer team? These absurd questions might be reality if the United States had not won the Mexican-American War in 1848.

At a time when the United States was finally in a position to exert some influence over the huge land mass of North America, traditional European powers began to envision the idea of colonial outposts in the unclaimed American west. To counter this, the United States began to claim and annex large amounts of territory before England, France or Spain could control any more territory.

American statesmen felt that a European stronghold west of the United States eventually would mean military conflict and a possible loss of territory. When Texas proclaimed itself independent in 1836, the U.S. saw an opportunity to expand in the southwest. So, when Texas appealed to the Congress for statehood in 1845, President James K. Polk annexed the Republic as U.S. territory.

A series of raids by the Mexicans, who did not recognize U.S. sovereignty over the region, led to the conflict we now know as the Mexican-American War. At the time of the war, the greatest difficulty for Polk and the Army was quickly preparing to fight a large-scale land war far from established supply depots against a foe larger than any fought in 66 years prior.

Further, they must fight this war with an army largely composed of militia troops and a newly designed, untested combat arm, the Artillery branch.

In every major battle of the Mexican-American War, Mexico outnumbered the U.S. Army. However, outside the battles in California, U.S. forces held an advantage over Mexican forces due to their superior artillery fires.

Because the U.S. Army Artillery possessed a better corps of equipment and used modern tactics, they maintained a tactical advantage throughout the war. This advantage was a major factor contributing to the American victory in the Mexican War.

Three crucial battles — Palo Alto, Buena Vista, and Vera Cruz — were turning points during the war. And in each of these battles, artillery secured victory for the U.S. Army.

Palo Alto was the first engagement of the war, Buena Vista was the battle that clinched the northern territories for the U.S., and Vera Cruz provided a gateway to Mexico City. These victories demonstrate how American artillery impacted each major success of the war.

At the beginning of the Mexican War in 1846 the U.S. Artillery was as good as in any major country. Prior to the war, there was a movement to upgrade the capability of the artillery and capitalize on some of the European innovations in fire support. These came about due to the lengthy Napoleonic wars. During these wars, artillery began its move away from a siege weapon to a more aggressive battlefield weapon system.

Wars during the 18th century started to see artillery used more in the direct support of infantry, as in the Battle of Culloden in 1745. There the Duke of Cumberland used artillery forward to break the Highlanders, commanded by Prince Charles Stewart, before they could even come into contact with English regular infantry.

However, tactics of the day held that guns were still primarily a weapon to create a breach. The artillery attack on the British forces at Yorktown in 1781 is a prime example of this tactic. George Washington himself fired the first cannon that started a nine day, 10,000-shot barrage. This barrage eventually destroyed the British defenses and they surrendered.

Napoleon Bonaparte, an artillery visionist and student of Frederick the Great, used his artillery with surgical skill in his campaign against the Austrians, Russians and English. He was so skilled at fire support; his enemies had no choice but to quickly advance their tactics, just to combat the effects of French Artillery.

Napoleon's skill was demonstrated Jan. 14, 1797, at the Battle of Rivoli. There, the 28-year-old general fought Austrian Field Marshal Joszef Alvintzy de Berberek. The Austrians outnumbered the French 43,000 to 22,000, and had many more guns than the French.

On the morning of the battle, the Austrians were in a clear position to surround the French. Napoleon was able to prevent this and win the battle with well-placed artillery and cavalry. Further, he executed the battle with great ferocity.

Lt. Celso Gallenga of the 7th French Hussars wrote about the Battle of Rivoli: "Never was there so confused a battle as the Battle of Rivoli. The Austrians shaken by the fire of two batterys personally posted by Bonaparte at the top of the approach to the Incanale, and assailed in the flank by Joubert's cavalry, in short, finding French troops on all sides, imagined they were surrounded and broke and fled." It was Napoleon's grasp of each battlefield weapon system that gave him success.

These successes caused many innovations in the way maneuver commanders thought about fire support. Artillery had always been used as an indirect support weapon, placed on a hill overlooking the battlefield. It was used to fire into the distant line formations of the advancing infantry until the two sides had drawn within musket range. The Napoleonic wars saw artillery move to a direct support weapon system.

In America, tactically minded Secretaries of War sent missions to Europe to determine the best artillery systems and tactics for the growing American army. Secretary of War Joel Poinsett organized the last of these expeditions, which led to the creation of an Artillery Branch in 1841, just five years before the Mexican War.

Up to that point, the cannon was just another weapon system the maneuver commander had the responsibility to place and use. Now with an artillery branch, the maneuver commander had a professional artillerist to conduct fire support operations in battle.

In So Far From God, John Eisenhower gives a breakdown as to the condition of the artillery branch before the Mexican War. This, "included two light artillery pieces designed for field use, the 6-pounder gun and 12-pounder howitzer. Of these, the 6-pounder gun with its range of 1,500 yards and weight of 880 pounds, was the 'basic field piece' of the army.

"For siege purposes, a collection of heavy howitzers was developed. These included 18- and 24-pounder guns, eight-inch howitzers, and eight- and 10-inch mortars. The siege guns were heavy, some reaching up to 5,600 pounds in weight, and were impracticable for field use."

The new artillery branch had a great deal of inventory diversity, but no real experience in battle with artillery of any kind.

At this time, a young artillery major named Sam Ringgold created a system of direct fire support to the infantry using the light 6-pdr. gun. Key to Ringgold's aggressive use of the light gun was speed which earned it the nickname "Ringgold's Flying Artillery."

Not only could this piece move around the battlefield quickly, but the small crew needed to fire the gun and high rate of fire made it the ideal weapon to support maneuver troops. Because Ringgold's light artillery could adapt to the changing battle, it could be placed amongst the infantry and cavalry. This was a first.

Major Ringgold worked hard to prove to superiors that his new artillery tactic would be successful. However, not until the "Flying Artillery" proved itself in battle did he succeed. The mindset of the time with ground commanders was that the main weapon of the infantry was the bayonet. All other weapons were used just until the infantry drew within hand-to-hand combat distance. This was the opinion of Ringgold's field commander at the outset of the Mexican War, Gen. Zachary Taylor.

At the start of the war, there was only one battery of light guns assigned to each infantry regiment. Unfortunately for all parties concerned, the U.S. forces mustered at winter camp in Corpus Christi, Texas, had four infantry regiments, but only three batteries assigned, not even one per regiment. Later, this would prove to be a mistake, based on the success of the light artillery.

In March of 1846, General Taylor led the American forces out of camp and headed toward the disputed border between Mexico and the U.S. on the banks of the Rio Grande River, opposite Matamoros. There Taylor built Fort Texas, later to be named Fort Brown. After two months of building and quiet posturing on both sides of the river, Taylor led about 2500 men out of the fort toward their supply base at the mouth of the Rio Grande.

His plan was to fortify the depot at Point Isabel. While he was gone, the Mexicans began an attack on the fort, and crossed the river, cutting him off from the fort. There was no choice for Taylor other than begin the war. On May 6, 1846, General Taylor met the Mexican forces led by General Arista at the Battle of Palo Alto.

The battle proved to be a successful "trial by fire" for the new artillery branch and its new tactics. The Mexicans arrayed themselves across the road, tied into a swamp on one side and a group of woods on the other. They had their artillery placed throughout the woods, pointed in toward the road. Arista attacked fast with artillery. However, due to poor powder, the Mexican shells struck the ground too early and rolled harmlessly along the ground toward the Americans as they advanced.

The Americans advanced short of the Mexican musket range and stopped. The artillery rolled 20 yards further and went into action. The 18-pdrs. opened up with grapeshot and the 6-pdrs. opened up with exploding shells above the heads of the infantry. The Mexicans, in turn, used a poor tactic; they aimed solid shot at the American guns in an attempt to destroy them. This takes many shots under perfect conditions.

The American artillery had more of an effect by killing troops instead of trying to take out guns. Lt. U.S. Grant who witnessed the battle later wrote, "The Infantry stood at order arms, as spectators, watching the effect of our shells on the enemy." He noted the guns "cleared a perfect road" through the enemy.

Finally, after only five American casualties, evening came and the battle drew to a halt. The Americans did not know their victory was complete until the next morning when they woke to find no Mexican army to oppose them.

One of the casualties was Maj. Sam Ringgold. A Mexican ball struck him through both legs while mounted. He lived a while after the battle, but the sheer pain of the wounds finally killed him. He never knew that, in his report to Congress, General Taylor gave full credit for victory to Major Ringgold and his artillery.

Following the Battle of Palo Alto, Taylor successfully fought the Battle of Resaca de La Palma and the siege of Monterey. While the artillery played a vital role in each of these battles, the next major battle in which the artillery played the deciding factor was the Battle of Buena Vista.

General Taylor had to give up some of his troops in support of a sea invasion of Mexico in the south. Following the siege of Monterey, Taylor moved into the mountains toward a city called Saltillo. He began patrolling the area, knowing a Mexican army was moving north against him. The leader of that army was Gen. Santa Anna.

Santa Anna earned earlier fame by commanding the Mexican forces at the Alamo during the Texas rebellion 10 years earlier. He had since fooled President Polk to get a safe passage through the U.S. blockade back into Mexico. Once he landed, he built up support and eventually formed an army. Knowing the Americans in the north were weak and extended, and wishing to prove to his countrymen that Taylor's streak of victories could be broken, Santa Anna chose to ride against Taylor in the mountains.

Santa Anna started north with 20,000 conscript troops, but lost 5000 on the march. All that Taylor could muster to hold the line was 4500 volunteer troops.

On Feb. 22, 1847, Santa Anna arrived. Trying to press an advantage, he offered terms to Taylor, who flatly denied. The two sides began to skirmish back and forth, with no great success. The next morning fighting began again. The Mexican infantry had early success. Two divisions attacked the left flank of Taylor with the 2nd Indiana Infantry taking the brunt of the attack.

As was the tactic then, out in front of the 2nd, there was a three-gun battery of light artillery commanded by Lt. John O'Brien. He and his crews kept up the fire until the infantry behind them broke ranks and ran. O'Brien and his men gathered up what guns they could and escaped.

Not until the advancing Mexicans hit "the strong hold of the American line, a battery commanded by Maj. John Washington," were they stopped. Major Washington's crews began to hammer the Mexican infantry, stopping the Mexican advance.

Later on, the American center came under heavy attack. O'Brien and what was left of his guns were again at the brunt of the fighting. He kept up the artillery fire until all his crews were dead, then he barely escaped. The Mexicans were advancing quickly and the infantry could not stop them.

It is here that General Taylor gave the command that made him so famous. As the artillery fired into the infantry, General Taylor asked the battery commander, Capt. Braxton Bragg, what he was firing, canister or grape? Bragg said canister. Taylor asked single or double? Single answered Bragg.

"Well double-shot your guns and give 'em hell, Bragg." The first round staggered the Mexicans and by the third shot, they were breaking for cover. This was the last thrust of the Mexicans during the battle.

Once again, the proper placement of direct support artillery gave victory to the U.S. Army, and this victory came with four-to-one odds against Taylor. Santa Anna gathered up what he could from the battlefield and declared a victory, but he was unable to capture either the American colors or the plateau at Buena Vista. Unable, thanks to innovative use of fire support on the part of the American commanders.

A third battle in which the American artillery had a large impact was the first battle of the naval invasion of Mexico. This was the siege of Vera Cruz. While not an example of artillery being used as a mobile strike weapon, much like the Battle of Palo Alto artillery was responsible for the victory at Vera Cruz.

Even after complete success in the north of Mexico, there was no move toward ending the war on the Mexican side. Therefore, President Polk decided to strike a blow into the Mexican heartland and give them no choice but surrender. An invasion of Mexico from the eastern Gulf coast city of Vera Cruz would allow an army to make a drive for and capture Mexico City, the capital. This would force all field armies to cease fighting and sign peace accords.

To do this monumental task, Polk appointed Winfield Scott the general of the Army. At this point, Zachary Taylor had become a political enemy of Polk's and he wanted to give him no other opportunity to endear himself to the American people.

Although General Scott commanded the siege of Vera Cruz, it was in no way an Army fight only. This was a joint operation with the Navy shelling the city from both the sea and from shore batteries manned by sailors.

On March 9, 1847, General Scott started the invasion by putting ashore 11,000 soldiers in 18 hours. This was done without a shot fired. For whatever reason, the Mexicans chose not to defend their beaches, and allowed the entire invasion force to occupy without a loss. A terrible storm blew up as soon as the Americans were ashore, and it prevented most of the equipment from getting ashore for days.

Once the equipment did come ashore, the Americans began to lay siege to a city called impregnable by all who viewed her defenses. General Scott wrote of the defenses: "Vera Cruz was enclosed by walls 15 feet high. On the land side they extended from the water's edge south of the town to the water again on the north."

There was a massive granite sea wall protecting the waterfront and within the city were more than 100 pieces of heavy artillery. Some of this artillery came from the U.S., purchased just before the war. All told, the Mexicans inside the city could train 135 cannon on an incoming fleet, and could bring to bear nearly as many cannon on a ground attack.

To take Vera Cruz, General Scott had to act quickly. He had to avoid the oncoming yellow fever season in late spring. Therefore, he must either storm Vera Cruz or force its surrender.

He chose to bombard it into surrender. To do so, he landed four batteries of artillery, three batteries of mortars, and one battery of 24-pdrs. He gave placement of the guns to the Corps of Engineers, and the siting of the guns to Col. Joseph Totten, Chief Engineer. Later, during the siege, the Navy landed a battery of three 32-pdrs. and three 8-inch cartridge guns.

When the bombardment began at 1600 hours on March 22, 1847, it was with seven mortars. Twenty-four hours later, the huge bombardment had done little but dampen the spirits of the citizens inside Vera Cruz. It was then that Scott authorized the battery of Navy guns to open up against the walls. The guns were dragged three miles over land by sailors and soldiers and emplaced by Capt. Robert E. Lee.

Lee was able to get the guns just 700 yards from the walls unnoticed by the Mexicans. By March 25, the shells from the 32-pdrs. had opened up a 50-foot breach in the walls. Morale was lost inside the city, and a surrender expected soon.

Sidney Lee, Robert's brother, wrote home about the Navy guns he commanded: "The battery's fire was terrific. The shells were constant and regular discharges, so beautiful in their flight and so destructive in their fall. It was awful! My heart bled for the inhabitants."

In the late afternoon on the 25th, the city of Vera Cruz asked for a cease-fire. Scott later overturned this first cease-fire and the bombardment resumed for the night. The garrison commander, General Morales, resigned that night, and a second truce requested. Three days later, the city properly surrendered.

Lt. Napoleon Dana wrote home in a letter to his wife: "March 28, there is little doubt that both the city and the castle have capitulated. And what is our loss? Mere nothing! It has all been done by cannonade and bombardment."

A tremendous weight of shells fell on Vera Cruz. The Army Battery fired 3,000 10-inch shells weighing 90 lbs. each; 500 round shot at 25 lbs. each; and 200 eight-inch howitzer shells, 68 lbs. each.

The Navy Battery fired 1000 Paixham shot, 68 lbs. each; 800 round shot at 32 lbs. each. The Mosquito Fleet sent 1200 shot and shell averaging 62 lbs. each into Vera Cruz. The total: 6700 shot and shell weighting 463,600 lbs.

After an incredible siege, the total loss to American forces was 13 killed and 55 wounded. A loss very small indeed when compared to what was gained, the gateway to Mexico City.

Vera Cruz was taken without a single infantry or cavalry charge. Were it not for the artillery, Vera Cruz would have been an extremely costly battle. Between the casualties in storming the city and from yellow fever (due to a prolonged stay in the Vera Cruz area), the success of the artillery at Vera Cruz was crucial to later victory at Mexico City.

During the Mexican War, advances in artillery changed the future of American warfare on three different levels. The first was the impact of the war on future commanders, the second on direct support artillery doctrine, and the third was the impact on corps level artillery.

It has long been accepted that the commanders of the American Civil War cut their teeth on the Mexican War. Many of the best-known commanders on both sides of the war learned the hard lessons of combat leadership side by side fighting the Mexicans. As these personal lessons were learned, so were many of the lessons in tactics and strategy for the different combat branches.

Leadership in difficult situations was one element that the Mexican War developed in its veterans. The lessons learned by men like Robert E. Lee, U.S. Grant, Braxton Bragg and Jefferson Davis stayed with these officers and steeled them for the terrible destruction of the Civil War.

Lessons in warfare manifested themselves in the different battles commanded by these men. This knowledge gave victory to some commanders, from the Battle of Manassas to Gettysburg, and defeat to others in those same battles.

Some of the most important lessons learned were those of fire support. General Lee's educated use of artillery provided victory in numerous battles, but his poor use of artillery, especially on the third day of Gettysburg, sealed his defeat. There he sent an attack that might have proved successful, forward with no artillery support. These lessons, as a whole, shaped following generations of American Field Artillery commanders, tactics and doctrine.

The second effect the Mexican War had on the future of American warfare was the doctrine for direct support artillery. The concept of mobile, direct support artillery is probably the most important development of the Mexican War. The use of quick fire support at the critical point of the battle revolutionized the way commanders would use artillery and infantry in the future.

From this point forward, the use of artillery as a simple siege weapon would deteriorate to non-use. Instead, the concept of "Flying Artillery" and the improvement of the doctrine, to the post-war concept of forward placed, light artillery developed.

The realization that the more mobile the artillery, the better for use with the infantry and the cavalry, was obviously accepted. This resulted in the establishment of the regular artillery regiments, with permanent associations to maneuver units. Further, those units were given the tools to stay mobile with the cavalry and the infantry.

In reality, the utilization of the artillery in Mexico was so large that it caused an overhaul of all field artillery and established the example first set by Ringgold's Flying Artillery, as the new standard.

The new doctrine mandated that the light artillery must always stay with the maneuver forces, and no maneuver force enter into large-scale combat without the artillery present to fire preparatory, covering and suppressive fires. Hence it was from the use of artillery in the Mexican War that we still trace back our modern doctrine of direct support artillery today.

The final effect of the Mexican War still with us today is in the use of the modern corps level artillery. Prior to use in Mexico, large-scale artillery was kept at the Army commander level and only used for siege purposes. After Mexico, corps level artillery went from large, cumbersome fieldpieces to a standard piece that could be used in a support role for an attack or defense. The only large-caliber artillery left went to the forces laying siege to or protecting coastal cities.

Today, we have abandoned the practice of laying siege to a city, and leave that to the Air Force, and coastal protection is done by the Navy. However, the corps artillery is alive and well in today's army.

Upper echelon artillery is used not for siege purposes, but for offensive deep strikes, tasked down to direct support of maneuver forces, or in general support of the entire battlefield. It is one of the more versatile organizations on the modern battlefield. While the "deep fight" was not practiced during the Mexican War, the groundwork for the modern use of corps artillery started there.

The use of artillery to shape the battlefield at every level began during the Mexican War, and was refined over time to our present doctrine.

(About the Author: Capt. Jameson Riley Johnson graduated from the Citadel in 1989 with a BA in history.  He was commissioned in the Field Artillery and was assigned to the 528th FA and sent to the war in the Middle East. He then served in the 11th FA in Alaska. He has served in Turkey, North Africa and Japan, with both the infantry and the cavalry, and is a graduate of the Field Artillery and Infantry Schools and Ft. Leavenworth.)