This report of the 1862 action at Island Number Ten was presented as part of the series on coast defense during the Civil War. It appeared in the Journal of the United States Artillery Vol. 39, No. 3, May-June 1913. The editor noted that while not strictly a coast defense operation this was an operation of "guns afloat against guns ashore...."
After Forts Henry and Donelson had fallen, General Halleck was of the opinion that the movement down the Mississippi should be continued, and that New Madrid, where a Confederate force was, should be the next objective.
New Madrid was evacuated by the Confederates after a short fight; and Fort Pillow was selected as the next place for a stand against the Federals, while Island Number Ten was to be an advanced work to stop the movement of the Federals for the time being.
General Pope, after getting possession of New Madrid, advanced down the right bank of the Mississippi to a point about opposite Tiptonville. In connection with these operations there was a combined army and navy attack on Island Number Ten, which we are now to consider.
The fortifications about Island Number Ten consisted of works on the island and works opposite it on the Tennessee shore.
On the island earth works had been built commencing at the extreme southeast point, where was Belmont Battery, and extending about 1300 yards along the east front. The batteries, numbered from right to left, were as follows:
Battery No. 1 (Belmont), two 8-inch columbiads; four 32 pdrs, smoothbore; Battery No. 2, three 32 pdrs., smoothbore; one 24 pdr., rifled; Battery No. 3, two 24 pdrs., rifled; one 8-inch columbiad, two 32 pdrs., smoothbore; Battery No. 4, two 8-inch howitzers; Battery No. 5, two 8-inch howitzers; a total of 19 guns mounted on the island.
On the mainland were the following:
Battery No. 1 (redan), three 8-inch columbiads; three 32 pdrs., smoothbore; Battery No. 2, three 32 pdrs., rifled; one 32 pdr., smoothbore; Battery No. 3, three 32 pdrs., rifled; Battery No. 4, three 32-pdrs., rifled; one 8-inch columbiad; Battery No. 5, one 32 pdr., rifled; three 8-inch columbiads; three 32 pdrs., smoothbore; a total on the mainland of 24 guns.
In all on the mainland there were eight earthworks, there being in addition to the five batteries above mentioned three other works in the vicinity of Batteries Nos. 4 and 5; but of these only one, a square redoubt to the left-rear of Battery No. 4, appears to have had armament-some 32 pdr. smoothbore cannon covering the gorges of Batteries Nos. 2 to 5 inclusive.
Battery No. 1 (redan) was about two miles upstream from Island Number Ten; Batteries Nos. 2 and 3 were about 2000 and 2175 yards, respectively, down-stream from Battery No. 1; Battery No. 4, about 425 yards down-stream from Battery No. 3; and Battery No. 5, about 500 yards down-stream from Battery No. 4.
Owing to high water, part of the parapet of Battery No. 1 (redan) was washed away and the three 32 pdrs. could not be used.
There was also a floating battery, mounting nine guns; so the Confederates had some 52 guns in the locality.
Some miles lower down the river, below New Madrid, Mo., but on the Tennessee shore, were other batteries.
The strength of garrison manning the Confederate works was nine companies of artillery and some others of infantry; the actual garrison is not definitely stated.
The elevation of Island Number Ten was about 10 feet above low water; and, though its eastern front faced fairly directly up-stream for a distance of about 4500 yards, yet, on account of bars, the usual channel for steamers within about 2500 yards of the up-stream side of the island was not direct, but more or less parallel to the fortified eastern front.
The Federal forces engaging the batteries consisted of: six ironclad gunboats, one wooden gunboat (Conestoga), 16 mortar boats, mounting each one 13-inch mortar.
Orders having been issued to make preparations for this expedition, Flag-Officer Foote reported to General Halleck that he was ready to move March 12th, with seven gunboats and 10 mortar boats, but that he was waiting for the Army.
He was directed to move on the morning of March 14th. Transports with three or four regiments joined him, coming from Cairo, Bird's Point, and Columbus. The force arrived off Island Number Ten at 9 a.m. March 15th. Rain and fog prevented the flotilla's getting into position, with the exception of two mortar boats, whose purpose was to ascertain the range.
Early on the morning of the 16th, the two mortar boats shelled the encampments of some Confederate regiments, firing also on the batteries on Island Number Ten, the floating battery, and the batteries on the Tennessee shore.
On the 17th, soon after day light, the mortar boats being in position, the Benton was lashed between two other steamers (the Cincinnati and the Saint Louis), and with the remaining ironclads made an attack on the forts at a range of 2000 yards or more. It was not considered advisable to come in closer, on account of the rapid current's rendering the boats so unmanageable as to create danger of their being carried under the Confederate guns.
Moreover, nearer approach would have exposed the bow and quarter of the vessels, their most vulnerable parts, to a fire from six other batteries, mounting some 43 guns. The gunboats opened fire on the upper (redan) fort on the Tennessee shore at 12 p.m., and continued to give and receive quite a brisk fire till darkness obscured the forts from view.
All five of the batteries on the Tennessee shore took part in the return fire. During the engagement between the gunboats and the forts, the 10 mortar boats shelled the troops which were not manning the batteries and compelled them to withdraw out of range. The upper fort was badly cut up by the Benton and the other boats with her, one of the fort's guns being dismounted and the men at times having to abandon the batteries.
The Benton received four shots, and a rifle burst on the Saint Louis, killing and wounding some 15 men, while the Cincinnati had her engines injured. The shells fired by the flotilla burst prematurely, because of poor fuses, which were said to have been manufactured before the Mexican War.
On the 18th the upper fort was again attacked "at long range," another of its guns being dismounted. The mortar boats on this occasion fired on the lower works, the encamped troops having all been driven down the river out of range. The firing was now kept up day and night to prevent repair of the earth works.
On the 20th the bombardment was continued, still another gun being dismounted in the upper battery, which was silenced after half an hour.
On the 26th, Flag-Officer Foote reports having six ironclad gunboats, 16 mortar boats, and the wooden gunboat Conestoga—an increase of six mortar boats over his original equipment.
On April 1st a storming party of 100 men landed at the upper, or No. 1, battery on the Tennessee shore, and spiked all the six guns, the Confederates retreating. The Federal storming party withdrew after their work was done.
On April 3rd, three gunboats and three mortar boats fired for more than an hour against the floating battery moored off Island Number Ten. As a result, the battery cut loose and drifted down the river some two or three miles. The return fire is said to have had no effect on the squadron.
In the meantime General Pope, in command of the Federal forces, immediately after taking New Madrid had given his attention to intercepting navigation of the river below Tiptonville. This he successfully accomplished by establishing batteries at several prominent points along the river.
He had also, while waiting for Flag-Officer Foote to run by, begun work on a canal across the peninsula north of Island Number Ten, with a view to connecting the main channel above and below. The canal was completed and four steamers sent through on the night of April 6th.
Flag-Officer Foote was reluctant to run by Island Number Ten, not wishing to risk his boats at such close range, they having to pass some batteries at 300 yards. Finally, however, after much correspondence, but before the completion of the canal, Flag-Officer Foote allowed Commander Walke, who had volunteered for the duty, to attempt to make a runby with the Carondelet.
Accordingly, the Carondelet got through on the night of April 4th, during a terrific storm, without any damage whatever, arriving at New Madrid about midnight. Forty-seven guns had fired on the boat, but the shots had passed some two hundred feet above her.
Flag-Officer Foote was asked to send another boat, but he demurred at first, because of the risks involved; for, as he said, the boat would have not only to pass seven batteries, but also have to approach head-on 11 guns on Island Number Ten and pass within 300 yards of some 30 strong fortifications. But finally he said he would get another boat ready, and try to run by if the night of April 6th were favorable.
General Pope asked that the Carondelet on April 7th cover a crossing of troops and assist the Federal shore batteries in engaging the Confederate batteries below and on the opposite shore from New Madrid. General Pope's plan was to cross his force, 3500 men at a time, and attack the Confederates in the rear.
Commander Walke cooperated as requested, silencing and spiking all the Confederate batteries on the Tennessee shore of Madrid Bend. He reported "a desperate resistance" by the lower battery, which comprised two 64-pdr. howitzers and one 64-pdr. navy gun, all of which were put out of action by the gunboat's fire, two being dismounted and one disabled.
About 2 a.m. of April 7th the Pittsburg ran by the forts uninjured, thus making two boats below Island Number Ten, the remainder of the flotilla being still above.
General Pope now made ready to assault the works near Island Number Ten, attacking in rear, while the flotilla was to attack in front. As soon as the movement was gotten under way, the batteries on the Tennessee shore were hurriedly evacuated, the troops there retiring down the river and abandoning the forces on Island Number Ten to their fate, not even advising them of the abandonment of the works on shore.
Two officers from the forces on Island Number Ten boarded the flagship Benton and surrendered the works to Flag-Officer Foote. General Buford and his troops took possession of all works on the island and on the Tennessee shore.
Besides the armament, there fell into the hands of the Federals 17 officers, about 500 men, four steamers afloat, two steamers and a gun boat (Grampus) sunk, but capable of being raised, and the famous Confederate floating battery.
The Confederates retreating from the batteries on the Tennessee shore, together with such as got away from Island Number Ten, encountered the Federal forces at Tiptonville, and, amid great confusion, were driven into the swamps, where, finding themselves entirely cut off, they laid down their arms. The force surrendered was approximately 7000.
The records of this action as to hits, expenditure of ammunition, etc., are very incomplete on both sides; but it appears that there was comparatively little damage done the land batteries or the boats engaged, due, probably, to the long range firing that was indulged in.
This is another example of a place well fortified against naval attack being taken as a result of land operations: the works, successful in their resistance to the flotilla, were abandoned when their rear was threatened.
The naval activities about Island Number Ten afford examples of runbys successfully executed under cover of darkness, notwithstanding that the available waterway was very restricted and close to the guns.
The foregoing comment, in the light of the correspondence antecedent to the runbys executed by the Federal flotilla, but emphasizes the reluctance a naval commander feels in taking the supposed risk.
The work of the mortar boats against the encamped troops was conspicuous.
Island Number Ten is an example of the futility of long range bombardment.
The difficulties occasioned an energetic and determined commander through lack of the presence of a commander in chief of all forces engaged, is strongly emphasized in the operations against Island Number Ten.